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Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
This page outlines how the Australian Government, in partnership with state and territory governments and industry, has prevented BSE from entering the Australian cattle herd. It also outlines how Australia is prepared to mount an animal health response in the highly unlikely event of a BSE case in Australian cattle. Much of the information on this page is sourced from Australia’s Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Freedom Assurance Program website.
For information about BSE and its relevance to human health, please see the links provided on this page.
- Background - What is it?
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs)
BSE - Occurrences in Australia
- The Global Context - BSE
- Australia’s Approach to BSE
Summary
How could BSE be introduced to Australia?
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Freedom Assurance Program
Surveillance
Ruminant Feed Ban
Imported Cattle Quarantine and Surveillance
Emergency Preparedness - The Global Context - Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD)
- Australia’s Approach to Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
- What are the important facts about BSE?
- Timeline
Spotted something unusual in your livestock?
If you see something unusual and you're not sure whether it's
an exotic pest or disease - report it!
Don’t worry how insignificant it may be –
small signs may be an early indication that something’s wrong.
Immediately call the Emergency Animal Disease Watch Hotline on 1800 675 888
Background
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies
TSEs in animals are a class of rare brain diseases that are associated with the accumulation of abnormal prion protein in the brain and therefore affect the central nervous system. These diseases are very rare, fatal and are characterized by spongy degeneration of the brain. There are no validated live animal tests, no treatments and no vaccines for these diseases.
There are a number of TSEs which variously affect people and animals. Of most interest to Australia's livestock industries are:
- bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) which affects cattle and other ruminants and is commonly referred to as "mad cow disease"
- scrapie is a TSE that affects sheep and goats
- chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a TSE that affects cervids such as mule deer, white tail deer and Rocky Mountain elk
- feline spongiform encephalopathy (FSE) found in domestic cats and captive exotic cats
- transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) is a very rare disease of farmed mink, and
- Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is a rare and fatal form of TSE that affects humans worldwide. A newly recognized form of CJD, called variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), has been diagnosed in a small number of people since 1996 and is thought to be linked to the consumption of certain parts of the carcase of BSE-infected cattle.
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
For beef producing and exporting countries such as Australia, the issues surrounding BSE are highly significant and ever changing. As a result, the BSE issue involves many parties, from both government and industry, each with their own specific role to play in ensuring that Australia continues to meet international criteria for a BSE negligible risk country.
BSE is a chronic, degenerative disease affecting the nervous system of cattle. First diagnosed in the United Kingdom (UK) in 1986, it has since been confirmed in native-born cattle in a number of countries including Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada and the United States.
In common with other TSEs, BSE has an incubation period that is typically several years long. Most cases are seen in cattle over four years of age. Signs of the disease in cattle appear gradually but always kill affected animals within weeks or months. There is no fever. Nervous signs are always present, but variable, and can fall into three categories:
- changes in behaviour, such as nervousness, apprehension and frenzy when cattle are confronted by gateways and other obstacles
- abnormal posture and gait, such as staggering, swaying, high lifting of legs when walking, tremors, falling over and being unable to get up when lying down, and
- extreme sensitivity to sound and touch.
A number of proven tests for BSE are available, but not in live cattle. A combination of these proven tests may be used on suspect cases. These include examining slices of the brain through a microscope, with or without staining with special antibodies, and a number of rapid tests which rely on detecting the abnormal protein that accumulates in certain parts of the brain.
The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) sets international standards for BSE in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code. Although the OIE recognises that the cattle products listed below do not present a risk of transmitting BSE, Australia conducts risk assessments for these products in respect of other diseases of concern, in line with international standards, when establishing the appropriate level of risk:
- milk
- semen and embryos
- hides and skins
- gelatin and collagen prepared from hides and skins
- protein free tallow
- dicalcium phosphate
- boneless beef (subject to conditions), and
- blood (subject to conditions).
The OIE also recognises that only certain cattle tissues present a risk of transmitting BSE and recommends that these be removed from cattle from BSE affected countries at slaughter if they are above a certain age. These tissues are tonsils, part of the small intestine, brains, eyes, spinal cord, skull and vertebral column. These OIE recommendations on tissue removal do not apply to Australia.
The OIE BSE standard in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code is available from the OIE website. A disease card that provides further technical information on the disease is also available from the OIE website.
Occurrences in Australia
Australia was one of the first countries to implement effective quarantine measures against BSE entering the country (see the section Australia’s approach to BSE). Australia meets international requirements for a BSE negligible risk country. This has been confirmed by national and international risk assessments, for example those conducted by the Food Standards Australia New Zealand, the New Zealand Food Safety Authority and the European Food Safety Authority. An assessment by the OIE was released in May 2007 and concluded that Australia met the requirements for a 'negligible BSE risk' country.
BSE, CWD and TME have never been recorded in Australia. Scrapie has occurred once, in imported sheep on a single property in 1952 and was promptly eradicated. Two cases of FSE have been diagnosed in imported animals in Australian zoos in 1992 (cheetah) and 2002 (Asiatic golden cat). In both cases exposure before importation to feeds derived from BSE affected cattle are thought to have caused the disease. In both instances, effective response measures were taken.
As of June 2007 there have been no reported cases of vCJD in people in Australia, although it is recognised that one or more cases could occur due to Australian residents who have previously lived in the United Kingdom and while there eaten material from BSE infected cattle, specifically tissues such as the brain and spinal cord.
The Global Context - BSE
BSE was first reported in the UK in 1986. It was first thought to have originated from the ingestion by cattle of scrapie infected material from sheep, although the original source of BSE infection remains under debate.
Changes in rendering practices that occurred in the UK around 1980 are believed to have allowed increased survival of the BSE agent in meat and bone meal used as an ingredient in cattle feed. In this way the BSE agent was recycled in the UK cattle population. Due to the long BSE incubation period of several years, this recycling continued unabated without obvious clinical signs of disease, eventually leading to the UK epidemic.
Other European countries were also affected, although at a much lower rate than the UK, as a result of importing infected live cattle and stockfeed (meat and bone meal) from the UK. These include Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Spain, and Sweden.
A series of countermeasures were introduced by the UK and other countries to break the cycle of cattle re-infection. These measures included a ruminant protein feed ban as well as bans on importation of live cattle and ruminant protein from infected countries. The feed ban helped to reduce the BSE epidemic in Europe, with the numbers of BSE cases there tailing off after 2000 (see Charts B1 and B2 below). This evidence suggests that BSE can eventually be eradicated. Outside of Europe, other countries that have diagnosed indigenous cases of BSE include Israel, Japan, Canada and the United States. Again, these cases can be linked to the importation of cattle and/or meat and bone meal from Europe.
Note: When assessing the shape of the epidemic curve it is important to discount ‘active surveillance’ because it has not been a stable program, therefore, the number of samples collected in this category has rapidly increased since 2000 and there are no equivalent data to compare it with pre-2000.
Source: Report on the monitoring and testing of ruminants for the presence of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) in the EU in 2006.
Relevant information available from the OIE
International BSE incidences
OIE maps international BSE incidences
The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (the Code) aims to assure the sanitary (disease related) safety of international trade in land based animals and their products. This is achieved through the detailing of health measures to be used by the veterinary authorities of importing and exporting countries to avoid the transfer of agents pathogenic for animals or humans, while avoiding unjustified sanitary barriers. The Code chapter on BSE details international standards for measures used in preventing the trade related transfer of BSE between countries. View the BSE Code Chapter.
Appendix in the Code on BSE Surveillance
Links to BSE information in other countries:
United StatesCanada
The European Union
The United Kingdom
New Zealand
Australia’s Approach to BSE
Summary
Australia currently meets international criteria for a BSE negligible risk country, and this can only be assured by continuing to apply vigorous risk reduction measures, verified by an ongoing surveillance program. Through the TSEFAP, these processes are well coordinated, nationally uniform, transparent and auditable in order to demonstrate BSE freedom and maintain access to export markets for cattle, beef and by-products.
The Australian Government recognises that despite the best efforts to exclude serious animal diseases such as BSE, it is possible incursions could occur. Preparedness arrangements for large scale responses to emergency animal diseases are therefore a key element in Australia’s defences. Through the Council of Australian Governments, Australia’s preparedness to mount an effective, whole of government animal health response has been reviewed and upgraded. Furthermore, these arrangements are tested by disease simulation exercises to ensure a high level of preparedness.
How could BSE be introduced to Australia?
Key factors in the epidemiology of BSE are well established. These factors point to three main pathways for the possible introduction of the BSE disease agent to a country’s cattle herd.
Importation of certain animals from TSE-affected countries
Live cattle cannot be imported into Australia from BSE affected countries. The cattle that are still alive from the limited number of previous imports have been permanently identified utilising the National Livestock Identification Scheme (NLIS). They are also in official ‘lifetime quarantine’ so that they will never enter the human food or animal feed chains. Risk assessments have shown that there is a negligible risk that BSE was introduced into Australia by importation of these cattle. Information on the NLIS can be found at the Meat and Livestock Australia website.
Importation of contaminated feedstuff originating from BSE affected countries
The importation of animal-derived meat and bone-meal (except for fishmeal) from all countries except New Zealand was banned in Australia in 1966 as a measure against the importation of anthrax spores. Risk based import controls minimise the chance that other imported stockfeeds or stockfeed ingredients have been cross-contaminated with meat and bone meal. Current import policies are detailed on the Biosecurity Australia website.
Importation of biologicals contaminated with the BSE agent
Quarantine risk assessments have been made of vaccines and other biological materials that involve cattle and sheep products in their manufacture and that are intended for use in animals. Restrictions on the importation of these products have been extended in line with emerging knowledge of the BSE status of countries throughout the world. Current Biosecurity Australia policies are detailed on the Biosecurity Australia website.
Stringent controls are in place against the introduction of BSE through these pathways. In the unlikely event that the BSE agent is introduced through one of these pathways, the legislated bans in Australia on feeding ruminant animals meat and bone meal derived from mammals, birds or fish (ie. restricted animal material) will prevent BSE being propagated and amplified.
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Freedom Assurance Program (TSEFAP)
Prior to establishment of the TSEFAP, the many animal TSE risk reduction measures in Australia were managed and funded in different ways. The TSEFAP integrates all TSE measures into one national program with clear and nationally integrated operational components and a transparent funding framework. Information on the TSEFAP can be found at the Animal Health Australia website.
The purpose of TSEFAP is to enhance market confidence that Australian animals and animal products are free from TSEs through the nationally integrated management of animal-related TSE activities. The purpose of the program will be served by meeting the following objectives:
- to carry out sufficient surveillance to meet international requirements and assure trading partners, markets and consumers that Australian animals and animal products are free of TSEs and to ensure the early detection of a TSE (should it occur)
- to demonstrate that no restricted animal material is fed to ruminants
- to manage the risks posed by animals imported from countries that have had cases of TSE
- to provide a nationally coordinated approach to TSE-related research and development
- to communicate Australia's favourable status for TSEs consistently and efficiently
- to ensure Australia is adequately prepared to address any TSE case, should it occur
- to identify emerging TSE-related issues and provide a framework for their management, if required
- to provide a forum to involve all stakeholders in addressing animal-related TSE issues, and
- to increase the efficiency and consistency of management of animal-related TSE activities.
TSEFAP activities fall into six project areas:
- surveillance (the NTSESP and any other required surveillance)
- ruminant feeding restrictions
- imported animal surveillance (including zoo animals) and 'buy-back' schemes for imported cattle
- research and development
- management and coordination, and
- communications.
In developing the TSEFAP Business Plan, major stakeholders including all agricultural authorities from all Australian Governments, industry bodies representing producers, meat processors and the stockfeed animal feeding industry, and Food Standards Australia New Zealand.
Surveillance
Active surveillance for BSE commenced in Australia in 1990 and was modified in 1998 with the development of the National Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Surveillance Program (NTSESP), which is a core activity of TSEFAP. The primary purpose of the program is to support trade by maintaining a surveillance system for BSE that is consistent with the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, verifying that Australia’s BSE risk reduction measures are effective.
The NTSESP is a targeted component of Australia's overall disease surveillance effort. The overall system comprises both general and targeted surveillance. General surveillance comprises a wide range of activities to maintain a continuous watch over the livestock disease profile so that unexpected changes can be recognised. Activities include pre and post slaughter inspection at meatworks, inspection of animals at sale yards and other points of aggregation, farm visits by private and government veterinarians and results from laboratory testing.
Raising local awareness among veterinary practitioners and producers of the need to report nervous diseases in cattle is carried out by government officers, relevant industry organisations and veterinary practitioners. Training of practitioners and government officers includes awareness of BSE and other TSEs of animals, nature of the diseases, selection of eligible animals as well as specimen collection and laboratory submission to ensure the occurrence of TSEs in Australian livestock can be ruled out and alternative diagnoses confirmed whenever possible.
Current policies, programs and links to international sites are detailed at the Animal Health Australia website.
Ruminant Feed Ban
In accordance with a recommendation from the World Health Organisation, a voluntary ban on the feeding of ruminant meat and bone meal to ruminants was adopted in Australia in 1996. This acted as a fail-safe control measure to rule out the possibility that feeding will amplify the BSE agent in the unlikely event that it was introduced to Australia. Laws to enact the ban were introduced in all Australian jurisdictions in 1997. The ban has since been extended to 'restricted animal material', being any meal derived from animal origin including fish and birds. A uniform national approach to official inspection and auditing, coupled with industry-based quality assurance programs and third party audits, verifies compliance with the ban. A number of education initiatives have been undertaken to ensure that all industry segments are aware of their responsibilities. Current policies and programs are detailed at the Animal Health Australia website.
Imported Cattle Quarantine and Surveillance
Australia suspended the importation of cattle from the UK in 1988 and from other European countries in 1991, and from other BSE affected countries from the date the disease was first reported.
Cattle imported from countries that subsequently have reported BSE cases have been traced, and those remaining alive at the time have been placed under official permanent quarantine in accordance with Section 55A, Regulation 36 of the Commonwealth Quarantine Act (1908). This section of the Act prohibits the unauthorised movement of cattle, or their sale for slaughter, and ensures that their carcases will be disposed of in an approved manner upon death or destruction. All of these cattle have been permanently identified in accordance with the NLIS and their details recorded in the NLIS database. These measures allow the normal commercial management of the animals, but prohibit their use for the production of human or animal food.
Some imported cattle were slaughtered before BSE was reported in their country of origin. However, scientific risk assessments have shown that there is a negligible likelihood that BSE became established within the Australian cattle herd as a result of the importation of cattle.
Current policies and programs are detailed at the Animal Health Australia website.
Emergency Preparedness
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) – National response to a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, is the result of an agreement by the Council of Australian Governments that an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease and its consequences must be managed on a national basis. While this MOU primarily focuses on foot-and-mouth disease, it could be adapted by agreement of the parties for handling other major animal disease emergencies such as BSE. The MOU sets out a national coordination framework to ensure close integration of responsibilities and actions within and across jurisdictions which builds on existing animal disease and emergency management plans. The MOU is at the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) website. RTF [2.3mb]
The Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement is a landmark agreement that has been ratified by Australia's governments and livestock industries, with the aim of ensuring a rapid and efficient response to exotic animal disease incursions in Australia's livestock sector. The agreement is a world first and includes mechanisms for formal government/industry consultation on resource allocation, funding, training and risk mitigation. Details of the agreement are at the Animal Health Australia website.
The Australian livestock industries and governments have taken a proactive approach to being prepared for a BSE case. The AUSVETPLAN Disease Strategy for BSE provides a technical response plan that describes the animal health response a BSE case in Australia. The document was first produced in 1996 and has been updated since. It sets out guidance on control and eradication of BSE and is based on sound analysis and linking policy, strategies, implementation, coordination and emergency-management plans.
AUSVETPLAN Disease Strategy for BSE 
PDF [450kb]
These plans are regularly tested through simulation exercises and reviewed in light of new scientific information.
The Global Context - vCJD
Concerns regarding the potential for human infection through food were expressed soon after BSE was discovered and these concerns were heightened by the detection in the UK of similar diseases in exotic zoo ruminants (eg elands) as well as in domestic and captive wild cats. In the mid 1990s these fears were realised with the discovery of vCJD in humans, which was found to be closely related to BSE. All evidence pointed to the fact that vCJD had resulted from the human consumption of material from BSE infected cattle, specifically the so called bovine specified risk materials (SRMs) eg. brain and spinal cord.
Projections on the extent of a vCJD epidemic varied widely upon its discovery (up to 136,000 cases predicted in 2001) and depended essentially on its incubation period which was unknown. Based on current incidence data, the final size of the vCJD epidemic in the UK will be much less than was predicted in 2001. The number of vCJD cases in the UK has been falling over recent years providing evidence that the disease is waning in response to the earlier preventive measures implemented to limit the spread of both BSE and vCJD. As of June 2007 there had been 203 cases of vCJD reported in humans, including 165 from the UK, 3 of which were secondary cases acquired via blood transfusion. The seven cases of vCJD occurring outside Europe, are reported to have had food borne exposure to the BSE agent during periods of residence in the UK. Some cases in continental Europe are likely to have been exposed through consumption of exported UK beef products.
Links:
World Health Organisation factsheet on vCJD
Australia’s Approach to vCJD
Information on vCJD and implications for human health, especially in Australia, can be found at the Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing website.
Information on Australia’s policy on BSE and food safety can be found at the Food Standards Australia New Zealand website.
What are the important facts about BSE?
There are six simple and important facts to remember about BSE that can help anyone in gaining a better understanding of the disease and its basic science. All these factors make mad cow disease very different from almost every other form of infectious disease. The six facts can be remembered by using the acronym “PIMPLE”:
P - Protein Agent: Mad cow disease is thought to be caused by a special prion or abnormally folded protein. All other infectious diseases of cattle are caused by agents containing nucleic acids (DNA or RNA) such as viruses, bacteria, fungi or parasites. We have a much stronger understanding of these more common disease agents compared to prions, although a lot of scientific work has been and is being done.
I - Insidious: The onset of the disease is very slow with a very long incubation period. This means the period of time between the animal eating contaminated material to the animal actually showing signs of illness is many years. Most cattle contract BSE as calves, but do not show signs of clinical disease until 4-5 years of age. This makes the management of BSE very difficult as what happens with the disease reflects what activities have been practiced at a distant time in the past, and even before the discovery of the disease. Relevant activities include feeding practices or the importation of cattle from a BSE affected country.
M - Meat and Bone Meal Transmission: Transmission in cattle is thought to occur through the eating of prion contaminated material, specifically rendered meat and bone meal derived from infected animals. This material has been used as a protein source in animal feed. Entry into Australia could only occur through the unlawful importation of contaminated meat and bone meal, feeds cross-contaminated with this meat and bone meal or through the importation of infected animals.
P - People Affected: There is strong evidence of transmission to humans through eating food contaminated with specific carcase parts in BSE affected countries. The disease in humans is called variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease or vCJD. It also has a very long incubation period and although rare, this human disease is always fatal. The discovery of this possible human link in 1996 hugely increased the importance of mad cow disease. As of June 2007 there have been 203 vCJD cases reported worldwide. In recent years the number of cases annually has been declining. The principle means of protecting consumers in BSE affected countries is to remove from the food chain the parts of the carcase known to harbour the BSE agent such as the brain and spinal cord. These parts are known as “specified risk materials” or SRMs.
L - Live Animal Test Not Developed: There is currently no live animal test for BSE. Testing of brains for BSE after death is the only currently available method and it is expensive. This makes surveillance for the disease difficult.
E - Enormous Consequences: The combination of being such a strange disease, with a slow onset, a lack of ideal testing and consumer reactions reflecting the human link have meant that the disease has massive consequences for any affected cattle industry, particularly in terms of trade.
Timeline
| Date | International | Australia |
|---|---|---|
| 1952 | Scrapie in Australia - promptly eradicated |
|
| 1966 | Australia bans imports of stockfeed and ingredients of animal origin, except for products from New Zealand and fishmeal. |
|
| 1984 | UK suspects first BSE case. | |
| 1986 | UK identifies BSE. Southwood working party formed to provide advice on BSE. | |
| 1988 | BSE notifiable in the United Kingdom. Ban on ruminant protein from sheep and cattle feeds in the UK. | Australia suspends imports of live cattle from the UK and Ireland. |
| 1989 |
Southwood report states BSE is unlikely to be a threat to human health. Tyrell Committee established to advise on research priorities for BSE. Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) established. EU bans UK cattle born before 18 July 1988 and offspring of affected or suspect cows. Specified bovine offal banned from use in human food in the UK. |
|
| 1990 |
First case of feline spongiform encephalopathy confirmed. UK Chief Medical Officer states beef is safe to eat. |
Australia commences a surveillance program involving the examination of the brains of cattle that will identify BSE. Imported UK cattle place under quarantine observation. |
| 1991 | Reports of BSE in France and Switzerland. | Australia extends the restrictions on live cattle to include France and Switzerland. Imported French and Swiss cattle place under quarantine observation. |
| 1992 | SEAC states that existing measures should protect human health. | |
| 1993 | United Kingdom Chief Medical Officer reiterates that beef is safe to eat. | |
| 1994 | BSE shown to be orally transmissible in cattle. | |
| 1995 | First death of a person with vCJD. | |
| 1996 |
SEAC announced probable link between BSE and vCJD. EU bans British beef. UK bans cattle older than 30 months from the food chain. WHO issues recommendations on banning the feeding of ruminant meat and bone meal to ruminants. |
Livestock industry adopts voluntary ban on the feeding of ruminant-derived meat-and-bone-meal (MBM) to ruminants. Importation of specified foods containing British beef and beef products banned because of potential risk of vCJD in humans. Imported cattle from countries that are now BSE affected were traced and those remaining alive placed under lifetime quarantine. BSE AUSVETPLAN manual released. |
| 1997 |
Phillips Inquiry established. OIE BSE Chapter adopted. |
Legislation is passed in all States and Territories banning ruminant-derived MBM being fed to ruminants. |
| 1998 |
National TSE Surveillance Program established. First national audit of the ruminant feed ban. |
|
| 1999 | Ban on ruminant-derived MBM being fed to ruminants further extended to cover the feeding of specified mammalian material to ruminants in all states and territories. | |
| 2000 |
Phillips Inquiry report published. First indigenous cases of BSE discovered in Germany, France, Italy and Spain. |
Australia assessed by the EC as Geographical BSE Risk Level I:(most favourable). Second national audit of the ruminant feed ban. |
| 2001 |
EU suspends the use of meat and bone meal in foodstuffs for farm animals and will test all animals aged over 30 months destined for human consumption. It also extends the list of specified risk materials to include the entire intestine of bovines. Japan announces first case of BSE. |
Formal BSE/food safety policy introduced by FSANZ - country assessments commence. Biosecurity Australia completes a risk assessment that finds that there was negligible risk that BSE was introduced to Australia through the importation of European cattle. Third and fourth national audits of the ruminant feed ban. Imported Japanese cattle traced and placed in lifetime quarantine. Ruminant feed ban extended to include feeding all animal materials to ruminants, with the internationally recognised exceptions of gelatin, milk and tallow. |
| 2002 |
Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) completes the BSE risk assessment of Australia - Category A (beef and beef products from these countries are regarded as posing a negligible risk to human health. COAG MOU on national response finalised. |
|
| 2003 |
Canada announces first case of BSE. US identifies BSE in an imported Canadian cow. |
Ongoing audit prorgram for ruminant feed ban in accordance with national guidelines. Imported US and Canadian cattle traced and placed in lifetime quarantine. BSE AUSVETPLAN manual – major update. |
| 2004 |
|
Australia established the TSEFAP. This nationally coordinated program will incorporate the NTSESP, as well as established surveillance, compliance, research and development initiatives that are already undertaken by both government and industry participants. Biosecurity Australia completes a risk assessment that finds that there was a negligible risk that BSE was introduced to Australia through the importation of US or Canadian cattle. Australia assessed as most favourable BSE status by New Zealand and European Commission . |
| 2005 | US announces first indigenous (atypical) BSE case. |
BSE AUSVETPLAN manual - updated. TSEFAP website launched |
| 2006 |
OIE concludes that Australia meets the requirements of a 'BSE free' country. |
|
2007 |
OIE concludes that Australia meets the requirements of a 'BSE negligible risk' country (this category supersedes the previous 'BSE free' category). |
