Ecological inclusion: animal welfare and the total environment

Rod Bennison

<sup>Dr Rod Bennison is an academic at the University of Newcastle in Australia where he teaches
environmental science and ethics. He can be contacted at:

rod.bennison@newcastle.edu.au
or by phoning: +61(0)414914040.</sup>

• Abstract
• The concept of ecological inclusion
• Fundamental philosophical principles of commitment, respect and compassion
• Thinking and acting inclusively
• References
  

Abstract

Human lives are very much intertwined with those of nonhuman animals. Regardless of the reasons, and despite all attempts to separate ourselves from nonhuman animals and nature, human and nonhuman animals are irrevocably bound. The history of the interrelationship between human and nonhuman animals is a complex one. That history has been characterised by two underlying trends, one that sees nonhuman animals as being solely for human benefit, and one that sees nonhuman animals as kin or as beings that should be protected or nurtured. Ecological inclusion as outlined in this paper belongs to the latter trend.

Understanding how the different discourses and histories through which the interrelationships with nature are mediated and relayed is fundamental to appreciating how humans may relate with nature less exploitatively and in ways that are more inclusionary, particularly with nonhuman animals. Humans perceive nature and individual nonhuman animals in various ways.

In view of the depth of exclusion and exploitation of nonhuman animals that has occurred, and still occurs, and the level of environmental impact that humans are having on the planet, it is the contention of this paper that the need for a new interrelationship has become critical, one that is beyond rather benign environmentalism or some minimalist animal welfare agenda. In that regard, a new interrelationship between human and nonhuman animals is urgently needed that takes into account not just the welfare or even the rights of animals but more, one that considers the total environment.

Ecological inclusion as a concept is an evaluative process, the objective of which is to better review exploitative practices, to gauge the degree of disconnectedness that results from those practices, spatially, temporally and contextually, and to formulate more all encompassing moral, ethical and practical responses to how exclusion may be overcome or, if not, largely minimised. The overriding aim should be to establish the foundations for a new interrelationship that is more respectful and caring on the part of humans and one that may alleviate, at least in part, some of the ecological problems that ensue from practices and policies of exclusion, and thereby enhance the greater ecological whole within which all reside.

The concept of ecological inclusion

Ecological inclusion as a concept is an evaluative process to better review exploitative practices, to gauge the degree of disconnectedness that results from those practices, spatially, temporally and contextually, and to formulate moral, ethical and practical responses to how exclusion may be overcome or, if not, largely minimised. The overriding objective is to establish the foundations for a new interrelationship that is more respectful and caring on the part of humans and one that may alleviate, at least in part, some of the ecological problems that ensue from practices and policies of exclusion, and thereby enhance the greater ecological whole within which all reside.

Ecological inclusion is both a simple prescription and an alternative worldview that all humans, individually and or collectively, can potentially apply to all interrelationships with nonhuman animals. It allows humans to apply appropriate inclusive solutions to various exclusionary interrelationships in an effort to eliminate, or at least alleviate, exploitation. Solutions may need to be justified on certain ecological criteria and by looking at the total environment, as well as on moral and ethical grounds, such as offered by animal welfare or rights theory.

Furthermore, the practical application of the concept of ecological inclusion will always be place, time and context dependent, and, therefore, solutions would vary. For example, killing domesticated animals that have escaped and established themselves in ecologically destructive nonendemic ‘wild’ populations should only occur if it can be justified, scientifically, culturally, ethically and morally. That justification is contingent on the protection of, say, an endangered species in an area where that species has little chance of survival and upon ensuring that the nonhuman animals killed would not suffer in any way. Taking the life of any individual is in reality a denial of their intrinsic value; and denying such value in any individual should not be taken lightly. Making
decisions regarding the life of individuals is also potentially reductionist and mechanistic. An inclusive framework seeks to address such conundrums.

Building on the philosophical underpinnings of stewardship, welfare and rights theory, subjectivity and care, ecological inclusion involves reviewing those exclusionary practices that humans have imposed on nonhuman animals over time with a view to ultimately providing an holistic and less discriminatory worldview. The concept involves gauging the degree of exclusion that results from exploitative practices, contextually, and formulating ethical and practical responses as to how humans might establish better interrelationships and enhance the greater whole within which all reside.

During their short, shared evolution, humans have exploited nonhuman animals and plants for food, clothing and adornment, shelter, religious and ceremonial practice, and many other reasons. Concurrently, human civilisation developed and science and technology changed the way humans not only viewed nature, but how they were able to increasingly exploit it. Given the heavy reliance upon nonhuman life, it is perhaps not surprising that human utilisation and dependence upon other forms of life has become so over-exploitive and exclusionary of nonhuman animals.

If humans are to become less exploitive and more inclusive of nonhuman animals, then new interrelationships need to be established. A number of fundamental ethical and moral principles and precepts have developed over the centuries, which, to varying degrees, have attempted to do just that. That has not been enough; there have been too many barriers erected that would otherwise allow humans to better engage with other life forms. The overall objective of ecological inclusion as a concept, therefore, is towards overcoming those barriers by acting and thinking inclusively, with both individuals and collectively, in all our relationships with nonhuman animals.

The sciences of biology and ecology has allowed humans to develop an understanding of what links human and nonhuman animals is their shared evolution and the overall interconnectivity of planetary life. In fact, “the theory of evolution provides a profound appreciation of our connection with other living things in a chronological sense, ecological science provides an equally profound appreciation of our links with living things in a spatial sense” (Albrecht, 1999, p.116). More recently, complex adaptive systems theory has shown the extraordinary complexity that life entails in a contextual sense. Essentially, human and nonhuman animals are separated only by minimal degrees of difference, and the more that humans learn through scientific endeavour, those degrees of difference that supposedly exist diminish even further; as shown in the similarities between humans, bonobos and chimpanzees.

Therefore, implicit within the concept of ecological inclusion is the acknowledged view that human and nonhuman animals are most closely related and that the entire planetary ecology is invariably holistic. Some theocentric and atomistic concepts were devised to provide better outcomes for nonhuman animals or for the interrelationships between human and nonhuman animals. However, such concepts, more often than not, fail to give enough credence to the complexities associated with evolution and ecology, and are either bound to fail, or are not about seeking better outcomes for nonhuman animals at all, but providing ongoing justification for the status quo. Concepts such as stewardship, utilitarianism, rights and duties, based as they are on individualistic foundations, can only ever offer piecemeal solutions to the much more complex problems exacerbated by human exploitation of nonhuman animals. Nonetheless, they do offer some solutions.

Fundamental philosophical principles of commitment, respect and compassion

Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, Albert Schweitzer’s reverence for life, and Charles Birch’s postmodern ecological worldview offer important insights for a worldview that is more ecologically inclusive. Leopold stressed a deeper, more holistic approach to nature. He extended moral considerability collectively to the entire land community. Whether it was Leopold’s intent to extend moral considerability to beyond the realm of the individual and thereby capture all individual nonhuman animals within that consideration, or to extend it to include all individual members of wild nature, is a point that has led to much debate.

Undoubtedly, Leopold recognised that individual nonhuman animals are active members of the land, a “community of interdependent parts” (1970, p.239), and stated that humans can be “ethical only in relation to something we can see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in” (1970, p.251). Therefore, Leopold undoubtedly believed that humans should seek to understand and love individual nonhuman animals, as well as have a high regard for their value, to be truly ecological.

Applying Leopold’s logic to an ecologically inclusive framework, therefore, would also require humans to see, feel, understand and love nonhuman animals, or otherwise to have at least a firm commitment to the improvement in the interrelationships between humans and nonhuman animals. As such, an all-encompassing inclusive framework would initially entail understanding, loving and valuing both individuals and greater components of the whole such as habitats, communities and ecosystems. These greater components, like ‘species’, are nonetheless socially constructed and have also become surrogates to or an accessible means of distinguishing human concern. Therefore, the interpretation of Leopold’s framework as suggested by the concept of ecological inclusion described here, is most unlike Callicott’s understanding and extension of his formulations that have little if any regard for individual nonhuman animals.

Whereas Leopold believed that humans must think and act ecologically, Schweitzer extended that notion to one where the thinking should become engrained into the human psyche, that is, ultimately, it is human nature to revere life. Schweitzer believed that all human actions that affect any life must be judged on necessity, that all life forms are morally or ethically considerable and are deserved of at least a sense of reciprocity. In this regard, Schweitzer believed humans need to act in ways conducive to the overall maintenance of life itself; as Schweitzer said,

If I save an insect from a puddle, life has devoted itself to life, and the division of life against itself is ended (Schweitzer, 1987, p.313).

Schweitzer recognised some shortcomings of his ‘reverence for life’ ethic, particularly in relation to the guilt one may experience when taking actions that result in the death of a life form. Although ecological inclusion does not advocate the assumption of guilt, recognition of the importance of guilt in human interrelationships with nonhuman animals is nonetheless important, but only in so far as the need for humans to take their actions more seriously, as Varner maintains (1998, p.96), and to ascribe to thoughts and actions which promote the ‘good’, particularly so if humans are to have a clear conscience. Schweitzer believed that the ‘reverence for life’ ethic recognises no relative ethic and considers ‘good’ only as the maintenance and furtherance of life itself (1959).

In the pursuit of the good, Schweitzer believed that everyone must adhere to principles similar to that of the Jaina principle of ahims?, a total worldview of ‘right’ thought, word and deed (1959). It is maintained here that Schweitzer’s simple prescriptions and the basic principles contained within the Jaina ecologically-imbued ethic and lifestyle should lie at the centre of any human thought or intended action that involves interrelationships with nonhuman animals, let alone the adoption of a new holistic, ecologically inclusive worldview.

Birch provides further insight with a philosophy built on strong Christian and panentheist precepts (1991 and 1993). Birch maintains that God is both within and independent of nature, and that all human and nonhuman animals are subjects that belong to a community of individual beings, that human estrangement from our individual selves, humanity and nature must be reversed. In this sense, if one is estranged from nature, including nonhuman animals, then one is estranged from God; presumably, therefore, the closer one is to God, the closer one is to nature.

Yet Birch’s ‘postmodern ecological worldview’ should not be seen as limited to a Christian or stewardship foundation; such a reading would be far from Birch’s intention. He strongly contends that humans need to bridge the gap between their inner intentions and outer acts, that a “sense of at-one-ment“ (1991, p.xvi), or wholeness, between humans and the rest of the universe should be a constant objective. Such an holistic worldview is also implicit in the ideas of Leopold, and also in other philosophies, such as deep ecology as outlined by Arne Naess (1973) and Bill Devall and George Sessions (1985), and transpersonal ecology as outlined by Warwick Fox (1995).

Despite the criticisms that have been levelled against Birch’s gradation of intrinsic value, he strongly maintains that humans should recognise the intrinsic value of all entities nonetheless, and that our worldview must be inclusive of all nonhuman animals (1991 and 1993). What makes Birch’s ethic inclusive is his insistence that life, and other components of nature that are not living but critical to life, be afforded respect. Ultimately, it is only when humans feel love and compassion for both humanity and nature can they act in ways and be committed to lifestyles that are truly inclusive. The concept of ecological inclusion supports Birch’s view, but widens his idea of inclusiveness to encapsulate Leopold’s holism that incorporates the entire ecological community of “soils, water, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land” (Leopold, 1970, p.239).

Further, it is asserted that, following Schweitzer, if humans are committed to protecting or caring for any aspect of the environment (that is, the ‘land’) beyond the human self, then humans should revere all life. Not to revere all life, or to love and respect it as suggested by Birch, would mean that any action to correct the damaging results of exploitative actions, or to justify the continuance of actions aimed at achieving a greater good, would more than likely fail. Humans could then negotiate ways of engaging with nonhuman life and live lives that are ecologically-imbued. Humans could then acknowledge their place within nature, that they are subjects within a community of countless individuals, as has been demonstrated by the work of Jane Goodall and Marc Bekoff (for example, 2003), and as individuals with a countless community of inner microbial individuals. On this point, every human and nonhuman animal is also an individual ecosystem made up of countless creatures that in turn are vital to the life of that individual and the whole.

Ecological inclusion is, thus, both a metaphysical and practical response to the human interrelationship with nonhuman animals and is applicable to all life. If a human has reverence for life, then that human has the potential to commit to an ecologically-imbued lifestyle and a respectful and compassionate interrelationship with all individual life forms and to the total environment. That interrelationship is thereby inclusive of the life of all individuals and the ecological integrity of the whole.

Thinking and acting inclusively

Implicit within an ecologically inclusive worldview, is the recognition that, no matter what perceptions of nature may be held by any human individual, there is an overarching oneness or unity within nature and that all life forms have an inherent worth or intrinsic value. Such worth or value is an importance that cannot be quantified in any human sense as a degree of usefulness to humanity. Further, all individuals can potentially contribute to the fecundity and well-being of the whole; appositely, their inherent worth or intrinsic value also relates to their potentiality as fecund and or contributive individuals within the greater whole.

Every individual human and nonhuman animal, whether they be cognizant of it or not, are also in and of themselves ecologically significant to the integrity and maintenance of the whole. All individuals should have the ‘right’ to have their inherent worth or intrinsic value upheld, whilst having the ability to pursue their individual ecological and evolutionary paths, as long as that does not impinge on the biological and ecological integrity of the greater whole.

Yet, human lives and their interrelationships with nonhuman animals are more temporally and spatially complex than any prescription to exclusionary practices can
possibly remedy. Humans perceive nature and engage with nonhuman animals in countless ways, from the most caring and respectful of relationships to the most destructive and exclusionary forms of exploitation. Yet, if humans acted in ways that were less exploitative and exclusionary, then survival rates for threatened individuals and habitats may improve.

Further, humans act in ways which equate individual nonhuman animals with their ‘species’, as environmentalists and conservation biologists do when they stress the need to eradicate, the inappropriately labelled, ‘invasive species’. Such ecosystemic reductionism does no more than continue to justify ongoing exploitation and exclusion of nonhuman animals (Noske, 2004). As ecological inclusion as an alternative worldview does not support any action that excludes or exploits nonhuman animals, (in fact, it seeks to do the reverse), then it should not automatically advocate such reductionist and mechanistic prescriptions such as eradicating ‘invasive species’. However, situations do occur with some forms that become overly abundant and or ecologically destructively. In such cases, and after careful consideration of all possible alternatives, eliminating a life form from a certain locale (by death or relocation) might be justified if the survival of a particular life form is under direct and serious threat from the over abundance of another.

Other examples of ecosystemic reductionism include whether nonhuman animals should be utilised in invasive medical research or as food. In seeking solutions to complex ecological problems and ethical dilemmas such as those provided above, can ecological inclusion therefore uphold notions of inherent worth or intrinsic value whilst it also seeks to maintain the integrity of the whole or justify long-standing exploitation of nonhuman animals? Can both nature be revered and nonhuman animals respected, in such instances?

As human nonhuman animal interrelationships are so extraordinarily complex, so must the solutions be to the most problematic of situations. As suggested by complex adaptive systems theory, all biological systems constantly evolve and have the potential to adapt to change and move towards greater complexity and diversity, temporally and spatially. The responses that humans undertake to impact upon nature are also by implication complex, and are also time and scale dependent. They also need to be based on the context in which problems need resolution.

Hence, to be ecologically inclusive, humans must take great care and consideration as to the possible impacts that actions may have over smaller and larger scales, and over time. Any small action that humans take to enhance human interrelationships with nonhuman animals might result in massive changes to the way humans behave towards nonhuman animals. Such actions could result in a welcome positive reengagement with our nonhuman animal kin. It could also result in tremendous harm. To achieve or enhance the possibility of positive outcomes humans may need to think and act in certain ways to which they are not accustomed, and that includes thinking and acting in ways that are more inclusive.

Despite the uncertainties, it needs to be acknowledged that the actions that humans need to take in seeking or promoting the good would be directed simultaneously towards maintaining individual intrinsic value and welfare, and towards the maintenance of the integrity of the whole. This is akin to upholding a sense of “ecosystem being”, that is, an individual nonhuman animal has an identity by virtue of its ‘membership’ of a given life form and as an integral subject of a complex ecosystem. Importantly, the integrity of the whole cannot be maintained if the fecundity and well-being of individuals are not also maintained, and as stated above, that cannot be achieved if the potentiality of all individuals is not also upheld, independently and irrespective of human activity. In many respects, it is this that what makes the individual valuable. To be ecologically inclusive, as stated above, humans need to respect and revere nature and nonhuman animals and act in ways that ensures that the potential of all individuals is maximised. That would include thinking and then acting to protect and enhance the intrinsic value that lies within each individual and the whole.

Humans have a personal and societal obligation to commit to a worldview that is both respectful of and compassionate towards nonhuman animals and the total environment. Humans need to revere nature, and accept and appreciate that all individuals are subjects within the greater whole and that even they are complex whole ecosystems for even smaller organisms. Secondly, there must be an underlying commitment by all humans to consider all components of nature as morally considerable. That consideration extends to recognising and ensuring that the role that individuals make within the greater ecological whole is upheld; not to do so is a form of reductionism that fails to recognise and appreciate the place or significance of the individual subject within the whole. At this point, it is important to stress that, as far as is possible, each human should consider all known possible variables with respect to seeking the best outcomes for nonhuman animals, at least far as can be determined, as without doing so amounts to reductionism and would fail the test of inclusivity.

Therefore, how do humans eliminate or remedy the exploitation that nonhuman animals face at the hands of humanity? Solutions may involve personal or familial choice, others a community or nation-wide response. Someone, for instance, may decide to become a vegan in order to have a lesser impact upon the planet; another may decide to stop gambling on horse races to lessen the patronage. A community may decide to institute local measures such as keeping their feline companions indoors at night; whilst a nation may decide to legislate for better outcomes for nonhuman animals based on animal welfare precepts as we have had presented here this week.

If a human (or group of humans) thinks and acts inclusively, as outlined above, then the practical responses subsequently made could not be labelled reductionist, although the concepts utilised in changing human practice may, in other instances, be considered reductionist. In an ecologically inclusive framework, they are but tools utilised as part of an holistic approach in solving ethical and moral dilemmas. If humans think and act inclusively, they may then, individually or collectively, gauge the degree of disconnectedness that results from exclusionary and exploitative practices, and formulate practical responses to how they might establish better interrelationships with nonhuman animals, and enhance the greater ecological whole within which all reside.

Ecological inclusion is not just a theoretical response to the human interrelationship with nonhuman animals. It is potentially applicable to all life, and can be applied to temporal and spatial contexts on a planet with an increasingly impoverished and exploited ecological condition. Having reverence for life, and respect and compassion for individuals and the total environment, becoming life-centred, and eventually by adopting ecologically-imbued lifestyles, humans would become wholly ecologically inclusive. It is in this sense that it is hoped that the concept of ecological inclusion may deliver a practical outcome as an environmentalist and interventionist prescription for a more inclusionary and participatory ethic for both individual nonhuman animals as well as broader nature. Humans may be confronted with difficult and complex problems that they may find hard to solve. However, solve them they must, as the degree of exclusion and exploitation that nonhuman animals are now subjected is too great.

References

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