Review of post-arrival quarantine facilities for the importation of horses
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Word [1.23mb]Review of post-arrival quarantine facilities for the importation of horses—Report of the Expert Group established to provide advice on post-arrival quarantine facilities used for the importation of horses
© February 2009
Commonwealth of Australia
Cite this report as: Office of the Chief Veterinary Officer (2009) Review of Post-arrival Quarantine Facilities for the Importation of Horses. Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Canberra.
3. Principles for post-arrival quarantine
4. Post-arrival quarantine arrangements for horse imports
5.1 Melbourne Airport
5.1.1 Melbourne Airport findings and recommendations
5.2 Sydney Airport
5.2.1 Sydney Airport findings and recommendations
5.3 Airstalls
5.3.1 Airstalls findings and recommendations
5.3.1.1 Design of airstalls
5.3.1.2 Handling airstalls
5.3.1.3 Cleaning airstalls
5.3.1.4 Movement of grooms between airstalls
5.4 Personal protective clothing
5.4.1 Protective clothing requirements for non-AQIS personnel in the corral
5.5 Other issues
5.5.1 Cleaning and disinfection of aircraft
5.5.2 Chemical disinfection of airstalls, trucks and other items
5.5.3 AQIS escort from the airport to the quarantine station
6. Quarantine station facilities
6.1 Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations
6.1.1 Quarantine station findings and recommendations
6.1.1.1 Controlling and monitoring access to the horse compound
6.1.1.2 Showering facilities
6.1.1.3 Effluent and waste water treatment
6.1.1.4 Horse stabling facilities
6.1.1.5 Veterinary medical and surgical facilities
6.1.1.6 Horse crush
6.1.1.7 Groom accommodation
6.1.1.8 Exercise and sand yards
6.1.1.9 Service delivery access
6.1.1.10 Other issues
6.2 Sandown Quarantine Station
6.2.1 Sandown Quarantine Station findings
7. Horse separation at quarantine stations
9. Appendix A—Expert Group terms of reference
10. Appendix B—Expert Group panel members
11. Appendix C—Stakeholder consultation
Note: Appendices D, E, F, G and H have been removed from this version of the Expert Group report due to copyright issues
12. Appendix D—Melbourne Airport post-arrival quarantine facilities
13. Appendix E—Sydney Airport post-arrival quarantine facilities
14. Appendix F—Spotswood Quarantine Station
15. Appendix G—Eastern Creek Quarantine Station
16. Appendix H—Sandown Quarantine Station
17. Appendix I—Expert Group letter to Rob Delane, ED AQIS
18. Appendix J—Rob Delane, ED AQIS, response to the Expert Group
1. Executive summary
Following the outbreak of equine influenza in August 2007 the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) strengthened post-arrival quarantine measures associated with the importation of horses. AQIS further strengthened quarantine measures after the release of the Report of the Equine Influenza Inquiry, chaired by Commissioner Callinan, in June 2008. The strengthened quarantine measures recommended by Commissioner Callinan included interim upgrades of facilities at Melbourne and Sydney airports, and Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations; and revised import conditions and work procedures. In addition to strengthened quarantine measures, the Report of the Equine Influenza Inquiry also recommended that experts in biosecurity containment provide advice to AQIS on post-arrival quarantine facilities at Eastern Creek and Spotswood quarantine stations and at Sydney and Melbourne airports (recommendations 14, 15 and 20).
In August 2008 AQIS established an Expert Group on Horse Importation (the Expert Group) to review post-arrival quarantine facilities used for importing horses including the privately owned and managed Sandown Quarantine Station. The Expert Group inspected post-arrival quarantine facilities between October 2008 and January 2009 and met with a range of stakeholders including AQIS staff, horse importers and airport, airline, freight handling and waste management representatives. This report outlines the Expert Group’s findings on each post-arrival quarantine facility used for horse importation and its recommendations to enhance biosecurity arrangements.
The Expert Group found that the current temporary facilities at Melbourne Airport were adequate to manage biosecurity risks however a permanent arrangement specifically designated for horse imports and exports would be preferable. At Sydney airport the Expert Group concluded that the existing livestock transfer corral for horse imports is of a high standard and effective for managing biosecurity risks. The facility could be improved through the installation of a one-way exit gate for pedestrians.
A key concern of the Expert Group was the cleaning and decontamination of airstalls at Sydney Airport. The Expert Group considered the procedure of removing airstalls from the airport significantly increased biosecurity risks and that all airstalls should be cleaned and decontaminated at the airport. In addition, the Expert Group found that having the flaps down on airstalls during unloading did not significantly improve biosecurity and that opening the flaps was desirable for animal welfare considerations, especially during warmer months.
The Expert Group considered the facilities at Spotswood Quarantine Station to be generally acceptable for managing biosecurity risks except for the management of potentially contaminated liquid effluents. The Expert Group identified a number of concerns with facilities at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station including the shower facilities, vehicular access and management of effluent and stormwater. The Expert Group’s concerns with the shower facilities and vehicular access at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station were brought to the attention of AQIS in December 2008 as a matter of urgency. The Expert Group concluded that post-arrival quarantine facilities at Sandown Quarantine Station were of a high standard.
The Expert Group considered a number of improvements should be made at Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations to enhance biosecurity management. In particular, installation of electronic card access and targeted closed circuit television (CCTV) to better control and monitor access; upgrades to the showering facilities (Eastern Creek), horse stabling facilities and sand yards (Spotswood); provision of a horse crush; ensuring that access to groom accommodation was on the basis of need (Eastern Creek); and changes to the service delivery access (Spotswood). The Expert Group concluded that the provision of horse surgery facilities is not an essential part of a quarantine station.
Finally, the Expert Group considered Commission Callinan's proposal on the desirability of separate areas in quarantine stations to hold horses forming part of a single quarantine intake but that have been imported from different regions or have undergone pre-export quarantine in different places. The Expert Group concluded that there is no advantage in separating horses based on continents or region of origin due to the fundamental and essential principle that each quarantine station operates on an all-in all-out basis.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1
The Expert Group recommends that given the regularity of horse imports, Melbourne Airport establish a permanent location for the unloading and loading horses. The permanent location should contain the following features:
a. a permanent or temporary fenced corral to contain horses and restrict access by people, thus facilitating the safe unloading of horses from aircraft to road transport
b. good access to the corral for trucks and tugs, especially access to an unloading ramp. Preferably, road transport would enter and exit the corral facilities landside
c. showers (preferably of one-way flow through design) plus a covered waiting area either in or immediately adjacent to the corral to allow segregation of contaminated or potentially contaminated personnel
d. readily available or close access for cleaning and decontamination (or storage and subsequent cleaning and decontamination) of airstalls at the airport
e. be free of air containers, equipment or other items that are not used for the unloading and clearance of horses
Recommendation 2
The Expert Group recommends that a one-way pedestrian exit gate be installed at Sydney Airport to allow personnel to leave the corral immediately after showering.
Recommendation 3
The Expert Group recommends that should resources become available at Sydney Airport:
a. the corral facilities be modified to include the installation of one-way flow-through showers to prevent any co-mingling of potentially contaminated and decontaminated personnel and clothing
b. that a covered waiting area be erected for personnel needing to shower out of the corral facility.
Recommendation 4
The Expert Group recommends that the current practice in Sydney of moving airstalls off the airport for cleaning cease as a matter of urgency and that the current corral at Sydney Airport be used for the cleaning and decontamination of airstalls unless an acceptable alternative facility at the airport is provided.
Recommendation 5
The Expert Group recommends the use of a quaternary ammonium compound for the cleaning and decontaminating of airstalls, trucks and materials potentially contaminated with equine influenza. Such compounds are not corrosive for vehicles and equipment and are safe for people to use as a disinfectant.
Recommendation 6
The Expert Group recommends the installation of an electronic card access control and monitoring system as well as limited targeted CCTV at Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations.
Recommendation 7
The Expert Group recommends that AQIS continue to ensure there is a person present to regulate entry and exit to the horse compound 24 hours a day 7 days week at Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations while horses are in post-arrival quarantine.
Recommendation 8
The Expert Group recommends that the existing shower block on the perimeter of the horse compound at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station be upgraded with one-way flow through showers. The existing kitchen facilities in the building should be retained. This building should also be used as the main access control point for personnel entering the horse compound.
Recommendation 9
The Expert Group recommends that it is a basic requirement that all contaminated or potentially contaminated effluent and wastewater must be contained on quarantine stations and managed in such a way as to address biosecurity risks and meet statutory/regulatory obligations, before going off-site. Further, effluent and wastewater management systems must be regularly monitored and maintained.
At Spotswood Quarantine Station, potentially contaminated liquid effluents are contained on site but the treatment system needed urgent overhaul and effective decontamination practices implemented.
At Eastern Creek Quarantine Station, potentially contaminated washdown water from stables must be contained and effectively decontaminated before leaving the site.
Recommendation 10
The Expert Group recommends that should Spotswood or Eastern Creek quarantine stations continue to be used in the medium to long term, the horse stabling facilities must be reviewed and redesigned to reduce the risk of injury to horses and personnel, and improve ventilation.
Recommendation 11
The Expert Group recommends that the horse industry and horse importers work with AQIS to determine the veterinary medical and surgical facilities and equipment that industry will provide for the treatment of imported horses that may become sick or injured at a quarantine station.
Recommendation 12
The Expert Group recommends that AQIS provide a horse crush at both Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations to minimise the risk of injury to people and horses associated with the testing and sampling requirements. AQIS should consult with importers and their veterinarians on the type of horse crush to be provided.
Recommendation 13
The Expert Group recommends that sleeping accommodation for grooms should not be provided within the horse compound at quarantine stations; however, suitable amenities should be provided for grooms that are on duty. Recommendation 14 The Expert Group recommends that if Spotswood Quarantine Station is to continue as a post-arrival quarantine facility for horses beyond the current lease arrangements then the sand yards should be re-fenced to minimise the potential risk of injury to horses.
Recommendation 15
The Expert Group recommends that AQIS explore options to establish a loading dock at the perimeter of the horse compound at Spotswood Quarantine Station to eliminate the need for service deliveries to enter the compound.
Recommendation 16
The Expert Group recommends that AQIS establish a new access route to the cat and dog compound at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station that does not run through the horse compound.
Recommendation 17
The Expert Group recommends that irrespective of the decisions on the future of quarantine stations for horse imports, and any decisions that may be made with respect to post-arrival quarantine facilities at airports, the design and construction of any future post-arrival quarantine facilities for importing horses must be consistent with the principles and associated minimum requirements for biosecurity, animal welfare, and occupational health and safety outlined in this report.
2. Introduction
On the 12 June 2008, the Hon Tony Burke MP, Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, released Equine Influenza: the August 2007 outbreak in Australia (the Report of the Equine Influenza Inquiry1), which examined the circumstances that contributed to the outbreak of equine influenza in Australia in August 2007. Minister Burke also released the Government's response2 to the report's recommendations.
The Report of the Equine Influenza Inquiry made a number of specific recommendations in relation to post-arrival quarantine facilities for horses including:
Recommendation 14
That the facilities for unloading and transferring of horses at Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport be upgraded without delay, following the advice of experts in biosecurity containment, so as to enable appropriate biosecurity precautions to be undertaken effectively and to minimise the risk of injury to horses and those handling them. The facilities should include at least one padded box or stall sound-proofed to the extent that it is reasonable to do so.
Recommendation 15
That facilities for the unloading and transferring of horses at Tullamarine Airport in Melbourne be constructed urgently, upon advice of experts in biosecurity containment, to enable adequate biosecurity precautions to be taken effectively and to minimise the risk of injury to horses and those handling them.
Recommendation 20
That the facilities at Eastern Creek and Spotswood quarantine stations be reviewed by AQIS in consultation with experts in biosecurity and interested parties including state and territory governments, import agents, veterinarians, farriers, operators of private quarantine stations, and representatives of horse owners, horse racing organisations and equestrian organisations. There should in any event be constructed without delay, an adequate supply of hygienic, modern showering facilities and places of entry and exit to the stations and the horse sections of them that can be supervised and monitored continually. There should also be provided at those stations as soon as is practicable suitable means of electronic surveillance, including closed-circuit television; a secure place to store chemicals, drugs, instruments and equipment for use by people attending the quarantined horses, and a set of horse stalls and yards separate from the main stalls and yards to enable isolation of horses suffering from contagious or infectious diseases. These reviews should also consider the desirability of separate areas in quarantine stations to hold horses forming part of a single quarantine intake but that have been imported from different regions or have undergone pre-export quarantine in different places. The reviews should be carried out without delay, and the two quarantine stations should be upgraded in accordance with the recommendations of the reviews.
In its response, the Australian Government agreed with each of these recommendations and for experts in biosecurity containment and animal health and safety to be engaged to inspect and assess the adequacy of the facilities for unloading and transferring of horses at Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport and the construction of facilities at Melbourne Airport. The Government also agreed that the same experts would review the facilities at Eastern Creek and Spotswood quarantine stations.
In July 2008 the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service established the Expert Group chaired by the Australian Chief Veterinary Officer. The Expert Group was established to inspect post-arrival quarantine facilities and provide advice to the Executive Director of the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service on biosecurity containment and animal health and safety, as related to horse imports. Specifically, the Expert Group was tasked with inspecting and assessing post-arrival quarantine facilities at Eastern Creek, Spotswood and Sandown quarantine stations, and at Sydney and Melbourne Airports. The Expert Group's terms of reference are provided in Appendix 1.
In undertaking the review of post-arrival quarantine facilities used for horse imports, members of the Expert Group observed the unloading of horses and inspected facilities at Melbourne and Sydney airports and inspected facilities at Spotswood, Sandown and Eastern Creek quarantine stations between October 2008 and January 2009. The recommendations of the Equine Influenza Inquiry report did not specifically require facilities at Sandown Quarantine Station to be reviewed. The Expert Group, however, considered it important for Sandown Quarantine Station to be included in this review it plays an important role in post-arrival quarantine arrangements for imported horses. The facilities at the station were also noted as best practice by Commissioner Callinan during the Equine Influenza Inquiry.
[NOTE: The Expert Group did not inspect or consider facilities for the post-arrival handling and transport of horses from New Zealand, as no post-arrival quarantine procedures are prescribed.]
In addition to the physical inspection of post-arrival quarantine facilities the Expert Group also met with a range of stakeholders in Melbourne and Sydney including AQIS staff, horse importers and airport, airline, freight handling and cleaning representatives.
This report provides an overview of each of the facilities inspected by the Expert Group and the findings from these inspections. The report also provides specific recommendations relating to biosecurity containment and animal welfare issues at each of the post-arrival quarantine facilities inspected. As suggested by Commissioner Callinan, the Expert Group also considered the desirability of separate areas in post-arrival quarantine stations to hold horses forming part of a single quarantine intake but that have been imported from different regions or have undertaken pre-export quarantine in different places.
Although the terms of reference for the Expert Group were quite specific in requiring the group to review and inspect post-arrival quarantine facilities, the Expert Group agreed that to undertake the task effectively some consideration would also need to be given to AQIS operational and work procedures. The Expert Group considered that work procedures are essential in informing both AQIS and non-AQIS personnel on how facilities are to be used and what sort of facilities are required to implement effective biosecurity arrangements. Thus work procedures were considered by the Expert Group and a number of issues highlighted for attention. The Expert Group was aware that Biosecurity Australia has been tasked with reviewing post-arrival quarantine operations and work procedures and providing specific advice to AQIS on these matters.
3. Principles for post-arrival quarantine
Australia's quarantine arrangements seek to minimise the risk of entry of harmful exotic pests and diseases to the extent necessary to meet Australia's Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP). This is achieved by AQIS through the implementation of a number of pre-border and border measures including pre-export quarantine, border inspections and post-arrival quarantine.
Post-arrival quarantine facilities allow the monitoring and management of possible biosecurity risks that may not have been sufficiently addressed before importation to meet Australia's ALOP. Post-arrival quarantine facilities enable the use of quarantine as an important biosecurity control measure to prevent the introduction of exotic pests and diseases. The fundamental premise that underpins post-arrival quarantine of animals is that facilities and procedures should be based on the assumption that imported animals and the goods associated with them may be infected or contaminated with an exotic agent of concern and must be managed as if they were a quarantine risk until the prescribed post-arrival quarantine has been completed. While Australia remains free from equine influenza it is necessary for imported horses and the goods associated with them to undertake post-arrival quarantine to mitigate any residual risk. Thus for imported horses, unloading and re-loading, transport to a quarantine station, and post-arrival quarantine facilities and procedures should be consistent with the horses and goods accompanying them being an actual quarantine threat and potential source of an exotic disease of quarantine concern or of infestation with an exotic pest of quarantine concern.
In conducting its inspection and review of post-arrival quarantine facilities the Expert Group considered the adequacy of facilities against a number of overarching principles:
- post-arrival quarantine facilities should be designed and constructed to manage the containment of any pest or disease of quarantine concern
- post-arrival quarantine station facilities should as far as possible be convenient to use, taking into account quarantine risks, and thus support compliance with the correct procedures. As far as possible any impediments that may inhibit, restrict or prevent personnel from following the correct procedures should be minimised
- effective biosecurity depends not only on design and construction of facilities but also on effective work procedures and personnel training
- since humans, horses and associated equipment are a significant potential means of dissemination of infectious agents from the quarantine station, access to post-arrival quarantine facilities should be kept to an absolute minimum with only those personnel that are actually performing a necessary duty permitted entry
- Australian post-arrival quarantine station facilities should be constructed to a standard that meets biosecurity requirements and international best practice.
Further, in the context of its work, the Expert Group was of the view that the principal quarantine risks associated with importing horses were equine influenza and exotic weed seeds.
4. Post-arrival quarantine arrangements for horse imports
The importation of horses into Australia for breeding, racing, competition or other purposes is important for the Australian horse industry. In the past five financial years, approximately 500-800 horses have been imported each year.
The main animal biosecurity concern associated with imported horses is equine influenza which is an acute, highly contagious, viral disease that can cause rapidly spreading outbreaks of respiratory disease in horses and other equine species. Australia and New Zealand are the only countries with significant equine industries that remain free from equine influenza. In fully susceptible horses, the major clinical features that may assist clinical diagnosis are fever, a deep, hacking cough, high morbidity, and very rapid spread to susceptible in-contact horses. The most critical factors determining the spread of equine influenza infection in horse populations are the immune status of the horse population and the highly contagious nature of the virus. According to the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, the maximum incubation period for equine influenza is 5 days and an infective period is 14 days. Australia’s mandatory post-arrival quarantine period of 14 to 21 days for both permanent and temporary imports effectively covers two incubation periods for equine influenza.
The equine influenza virus has a lipid envelope and does not remain infectious for long periods outside the host unless the conditions are cold and moist. Within premises, transmission of infection occurs principally by aerosol from the virus-laden cough. Contaminated horse transport vehicles, equipment, grooms, veterinarians, trainers and other people who have close contact with horses are all important mechanical means of transferring infection to new host animals. Equine influenza is readily inactivated by a range of disinfectants and chemicals, containing chloroxylenol, phenolics, alcohol, formalin and potassium permanganate. The surfactant action of soaps and detergents is an effective decontaminant for equine influenza virus because of the outer lipid envelope of the virus. Soap and water are satisfactory for personal disinfection.
Post-arrival quarantine for imported horses commences when the aircraft arrives in Australia. The quarantine process is initiated before horses or accompanying grooms leave the aircraft and continues as the airstalls transporting the horses are unloaded from the aircraft and towed to a livestock transfer corral. At the corral horses are unloaded from the airstalls and loaded onto road transport for transfer to the quarantine station. Upon arrival at the quarantine station horses are unloaded and placed in stabling facilities for the duration of the post-arrival quarantine. For horse imports Australia applies an 'all in all out' policy to post-arrival quarantine which means the quarantine period commences from the time the last horse for a particular intake arrives at the quarantine station. All horses are released from post-arrival quarantine at the completion of the quarantine period provided they have met all import conditions including that all test results are negative and the horses are not showing any clinical signs of disease. In circumstances where all horses in an intake undergo pre-export quarantine in the same facility and there is no co-mingling with other horses during transit, the post-arrival quarantine period is 14 days. In all other cases it is 21 days.
5. Airport facilities
All non-New Zealand horse imports into Australia are transported on aircraft and are scheduled to arrive at either Sydney or Melbourne airports. Post-arrival facilities at airports are used to manage potential biosecurity risks and facilitate the safe transfer of horses from aircraft to land transport.
In general, airport facilities present a lower biosecurity risk than the post-arrival quarantine stations because:
- the freight handling areas are very isolated from domestic horse populations
- there is only a very transient presence of the imported horses
- there is minimal contamination or potential for contamination of facilities and equipment—and little of this equipment ever leaves the airport
- there are high levels of general security, and personnel access to horses is highly restricted.
These factors contribute to a very low risk of disease transmission provided fomites that are to be taken from the airport are controlled, cleaned and disinfected.
Criteria for airport facilities
The Expert Group assessed the adequacy of facilities for handling horse imports at Melbourne or Sydney airports against the following criteria:
a. Facilities must be able to contain potentially contaminated material to a manageable area. Facilities and potentially contaminated material must be able to be effectively cleaned and decontaminated.
b. Facilities must minimise or control people's access to and contact with horses, airstalls and horse equipment. As humans pose a significant risk for disease transfer it is necessary for any direct contact with potentially contaminated horses or equipment to be kept to a minimum.
c. Facilities should minimise the period that horses are in transit from the aircraft to land transport and from land transport to the post-arrival quarantine station. Minimising the time that horses are in transit reduces biosecurity risks and addresses animal welfare issues associated with having horses confined to airstalls especially during hot weather.
d. Facilities should be designed to minimise the risk of injury to horses and humans. Apart from occupational health and safety and animal welfare issues, there are also increased biosecurity risks associated with handling or managing an injured horse or person.
e. Corral facilities at airports should be cleaned and decontaminated before they are used for any purpose, especially the export of Australian horses.
f. People who do not have direct contact with potentially contaminated horses or fomites are a lower biosecurity risk than those who do have such contact.
5.1 Melbourne Airport
There is no dedicated livestock transfer corral at Melbourne Airport. Since the outbreak of equine influenza the transfer of horses from airstalls to road transport takes place in a temporary corral on the tarmac perimeter between two cargo terminals. Temporary fencing is erected to form the corral before the arrival of each consignment of horses and dismantled after the horses have been loaded onto the road transport and left the corral. An unloading ramp owned and supplied by the relevant importer is used to transfer the horses from the airstalls to the road transport.
Only authorised personnel are allowed to enter the temporary corral and all personnel who enter the corral are required to shower at the airport unless they accompany the horses to either Spotswood or Sandown quarantine stations in which case they are required to shower out at the quarantine station. There are no dedicated showering facilities in the temporary corral, showering facilities at the airport are located adjacent to the corral in the cargo terminal. All personnel showering out at the airport are required to change into clean clothing and all potentially contaminated clothing is decontaminated by AQIS.
5.1.1 Melbourne Airport findings and recommendations
The Expert Group considers the current temporary facilities at Melbourne Airport are adequate from a biosecurity perspective. The Expert Groups notes that AQIS personnel are effectively able to restrict personnel access to the temporary corral where horses are unloaded from airstalls into road transport. The temporary corral is also effective for providing a safer working environment for AQIS and importer personnel and horses than was achieved with the arrangements used before the equine influenza outbreak. Although the Expert Group considered that the current temporary facilities are adequate, the Expert Group concluded that a permanent arrangement is preferable.
One of the key concerns of the Expert Group was the potential to delay the unloading of horses from the airstalls and onto land transport as a result of the design of the corral facilities and the limited space available. At the temporary corral at Melbourne Airport there is sufficient space for only one horse stall to be towed to the ramp for unloading and it may sometimes take a tug driver several attempts to align the horse stall with the ramp to allow safe unloading. The Expert Group considered this situation to be sub-optimal, as the potential delay increases biosecurity risks and creates potential animal welfare issues as a result of horses being confined to airstalls on the tarmac for longer than necessary. In such cases there is a risk that this might cause significant stress to the animals and may put the animals as well as the grooms and others in attendance at a higher risk of being injured. This is particularly of concern in hot months or when there is a large consignment of horses to be unloaded.
The Expert Group also noted that at times empty air containers, equipment and other items may be stored in the corral and be present during the unloading of horses. The Expert Group considered that the corral facilities should be clear of any such containers and equipment when being used for the unloading and clearance of horses.
In addition, the Expert Group noted that using the same corral may cause difficulties in situations where horses are to be exported on the same aircraft as the one used to import horses, when full separation between the two different consignments is required. The Expert Group considered it essential that the corral facilities are completely cleaned and decontaminated before being used for any other purpose, especially for export of Australian horses.
Finally, the Expert Group noted that the shower facilities at the airport were not located in the corral. Instead, potentially contaminated personnel are required to leave the secure corral area and move to the adjacent cargo terminal to shower. This arrangement is adequate but it is sub-optimal.
Recommendation 1
The Expert Group recommends that given the regularity of horse imports, Melbourne Airport establish a permanent location for the unloading and loading horses. The permanent location should contain the following features:
a. a permanent or temporary fenced corral to contain horses and restrict access by people, thus facilitating the safe unloading of horses from aircraft to road transport
b. good access to the corral for trucks and tugs, especially access to an unloading ramp. Preferably, road transport would enter and exit the corral facilities landside
c. showers (preferably of one-way flow through design) plus a covered waiting area either in or immediately adjacent to the corral to allow segregation of contaminated or potentially contaminated personnel
d. readily available or close access for cleaning and decontamination (or storage and subsequent cleaning and decontamination) of airstalls at the airport
e. be free of air containers, equipment or other items that are not used for the unloading and clearance of horses.
5.2 Sydney Airport
The livestock transfer corral at Sydney Airport is a permanent facility located inside the airport perimeter to the north of the international freight area. There are three gates, a security hut, a ramp, stables and showering facilities. A cargo handling company manages the transfer area on behalf of Sydney Airport Corporation Limited and is responsible for coordinating access to it, and for its general upkeep, including cleaning and decontamination following the passage of livestock through it. A procedures manual was jointly prepared by the company and airport management.
Only authorised personnel are allowed to enter the corral and all personnel who enter the corral are required to shower before leaving the corral unless they accompany the horses to Eastern Creek Quarantine Station, in which case they are required to shower out at the quarantine station. As with procedures at Melbourne Airport, all personnel showering out at the Sydney Airport are required to change into clean clothing and all potentially contaminated clothing is decontaminated by AQIS.
5.2.1 Sydney Airport findings and recommendations
The Expert Group considered the livestock transfer corral at Sydney Airport to be generally of a high standard for effective management of biosecurity risks. In particular, the Expert Group noted:
- the corral was large enough to accommodate transport trucks and allow them to exit the facility landside once the horses have been loaded
- the high perimeter fence and mesh to restrict access and to help prevent loose material from escaping from the corral
- the ease with which tug drivers could access the unloading ramp and bring up to three airstalls into the corral at one time (although only one could be unloaded at a time)
- that there are dedicated showering facilities located within the corral
- the four permanent horse stables available within the corral facility.
Although the Expert Group considered the corral at Sydney Airport to be generally of a high standard, it was observed that personnel and horse transport vehicles exit through the same set of locked gates. As a result, personnel who have showered are required to wait in the corral until the road transport has departed and the gates and roadway have been decontaminated. This situation is not ideal as personnel who have showered should be able to leave the corral facilities without delay. The Expert Group considered that a one-way pedestrian gate installed on the perimeter of the corral near the shower exit would allow personnel to exit the facility immediately after decontamination.
In addition, the Expert Group also noted that the existing showering facilities in the corral are not one-way flow through. The Expert Group believed that such facilities would be preferable because they reduce the potential risk of cross-contamination between dirty overalls and clean clothes. Further, it was noted that there is not a covered waiting area for people to gather before they shower. The Expert Group was advised that up to 19 people may require a shower once horses have been loaded onto the trucks, including AQIS staff, freight handlers and grooms not accompanying the horses to Eastern Creek Quarantine Station. The Expert Group considered a covered waiting area to be desirable to minimise any risk of cross-contamination caused by comingling of personnel in the corral before and after showering.
Finally, Commissioner Callinan recommended that the facilities at Sydney Airport also include at least one padded box or stall sound-proofed to the extent that is reasonable to do so (Recommendation 14). The Expert Group considered this issue and concluded that whilst it would be desirable to have a padded box or sound-proof stall to deal with an injured or fractious horse, such a requirement in the corral was not essential from either a biosecurity or animal welfare perspective. The Expert Group believes it is important for horses to be transported from the airport to the quarantine station as soon as possible to receive any necessary care or attention.
Recommendation 2
The Expert Group recommends that a one-way pedestrian exit gate be installed at Sydney Airport to allow personnel to leave the corral immediately after showering.
Recommendation 3
The Expert Group recommends that should resources become available at Sydney Airport: a. the corral facilities be modified to include the installation of one-way flow-through showers to prevent any co-mingling of potentially contaminated and decontaminated personnel and clothing; and b. that a covered waiting area be erected for personnel needing to shower out of the corral facility.
5.3 Airstalls
Horses are transported on aircraft in specially designed containers known as airstalls. Generally, airstalls can accommodate up to three horses with full height partitions used to adjust the internal dimensions of the airstall. There is plenty of head room and space for a groom to attend to horses during transit. Each airstall typically has a gap at the top of each side to allow ventilation, with flaps that may be pulled down over these gaps when horses are being loaded or unloaded from an aircraft. It is a current AQIS requirement for flaps to be down over these gaps when horses are being unloaded from the aircraft and transported to the corral.
5.3.1 Airstalls findings and recommendations
5.3.1.1 Design of airstalls
The Expert Group considered that the design of the airstalls was quite effective at containing potentially contaminated solid wastes such as sawdust, straw and manure. The Expert Group noted that airstalls are not designed to contain liquid waste. A number of stakeholders brought their concerns to the attention of the Expert Group regarding ventilation of the airstalls and current AQIS requirements that flaps be closed during unloading. The Expert Group considered the risk of contaminated material escaping whilst the flaps are open to be minimal and having the flaps on airstalls closed does not significantly improve biosecurity. As mentioned previously, the Expert Group consider the risk of horse to horse disease transmission to be minimal at the airport thus it is not a significant biosecurity concern. Animal welfare considerations also favour having the ability to have the flaps open so that the airstall is better ventilated.
5.3.1.2 Handling airstalls
During consultation with the Expert Group, a number of stakeholders highlighted the importance of unloading aircraft efficiently to minimise the turn around time of aircraft for commercial reasons. The Expert Group agrees it is essential that the handling of the airstalls is kept to a minimum. In addition, airstalls should be unloaded from the aircraft as efficiently as possible to minimise biosecurity risks and address animal welfare considerations.
Current AQIS arrangements for the unloading of aircraft require all personnel who may potentially come in contact with (i.e. touch) the airstalls, including freight-handlers and tug-drivers, to wear protective clothing, being disposable hooded coveralls over their work clothing. The Expert Group acknowledged that in developing work procedures, managing biosecurity risks is the primary concern. However, arrangements that are put in place need to be the minimum reasonably necessary to manage the risks. Different levels of risk should determine the nature of protective clothing worn and the cleaning or disposal of such clothing.
The Expert Group noted that during the unloading of the aircraft, airstalls are moved both mechanically and manually by freight-handlers and tug-drivers. The Expert Group considered that it is not necessary for freight-handlers and tug-drivers to wear full protective coveralls during the unloading of aircraft provided they do not have direct contact with horses or potentially contaminated material. In the view of the Expert Group the use by these personnel of protective gloves, the thorough cleaning of hands and face with a suitable disinfectant, and the cleaning of shoes in a suitable disinfectant is sufficient to manage potential biosecurity risks. The Expert Group referred these findings to the Biosecurity Australia Working Group reviewing AQIS post-arrival quarantine procedures and operations for consideration.
5.3.1.3 Cleaning airstalls
A key concern of the Expert Group was the process for cleaning airstalls. The Expert Group considered that the following principles should be applied:
a. gross waste should be removed, bagged and disposed of as quarantine waste
b. airstalls should be cleaned thoroughly and decontaminated before any further use
c. cleaning and decontamination of airstalls should be undertaken at the airport, ideally within the corral.
At Melbourne Airport the Expert Group noted that after horses are unloaded at the corral, the airstalls are moved to an area of the tarmac at the end of the freight terminal. In most cases the airstalls are cleaned and decontaminated at this designated area after the horses have been unloaded. The gross waste from the airstalls is placed in quarantine bins and sent for deep burial or disposal at a quarantine approved facility. On infrequent occasions when a consignment of horses arrives late at night, the cleaning of the airstalls may take place the following day. When this occurs the airstalls are shrink-wrapped after the horses have been unloaded. The Expert Group considered that the current arrangements for the cleaning of airstalls at Melbourne Airport are appropriate for managing biosecurity risks.
At Sydney Airport, after horses are unloaded, airstalls are transported to a designated area of the airport where they are shrink wrapped under AQIS supervision before being transported from the airport to quarantine approved premises at Camellia (near Parramatta) for cleaning and decontamination. An AQIS officer inspects and releases from quarantine cleaned and decontaminated airstalls before they are returned to Sydney Airport.
The Expert Group had serious concerns regarding the potential risk of transporting contaminated airstalls from off the airport. From a biosecurity management perspective, the Expert Group believes that airstalls should be cleaned and decontaminated at the airport. The Expert Group believes that the cleaning of airstalls off the airport in Sydney is an unnecessary risk that increases the risk of disease transmission. The Expert Group considered the current corral at Sydney Airport would provide an adequate place for cleaning and decontaminating airstalls.
Recommendation 4
The Expert Group recommends that the current practice in SydMYOPENSPANMYCLOSESPANney of moving airstalls off the airport for cleaning cease as a matter of urgency and that the current corral at Sydney Airport be used for the cleaning and decontamination of airstalls unless an acceptable alternative facility at the airport is provided.
5.3.1.4 Movement of grooms between airstalls
The Expert Group noted that horse importers were concerned that grooms are not currently permitted to move between horse stalls during the unloading process. Under the current work procedures, once a groom is on a stall that has been removed from the aircraft they are required to stay with that stall until it is unloaded at the corral. Under current arrangements one groom may accompany up to six horses transported in two stalls (i.e. three horses per stall). Thus if a groom is on one stall while it is being unloaded and there is a problem with the horse(s) on another stall the groom is not currently allowed to attend to the horses in the other stall.
The Expert Group considered that grooms should be permitted to move between airstalls on the tarmac outside the corral if there is a need to do so, especially to calm a distressed horse. Since a groom would have been attending to horses in both airstalls during air transport, there are minimal or no additional biosecurity issues associated with allowing a groom to move between airstalls during the unloading process. The Expert Group considered the animal welfare issues are more important in these circumstances relative to biosecurity issues. The Expert Group referred these findings to the Biosecurity Australia Working Group reviewing AQIS post-arrival quarantine procedures and operations for consideration.
5.4 Personal protective clothing
5.4.1 Protective clothing requirements for non-AQIS personnel in the corral
The Expert Group noted the current requirement for truck drivers to wear two sets of overalls while assisting with the loading of horses onto road transport at the corral. It noted the concerns raised by stakeholders of the need for truck drivers to unsuit and suit-up each time they stepped into and out of the truck. The Expert Group believes that this requirement may not add to biosecurity management and that alternative measures should be considered including the use of disposable plastic covers on the cabin seats of trucks, the wearing of protective gloves and the use of footbaths for drivers before they enter the truck cabin. The Expert Group referred these findings to the Biosecurity Australia Working Group for consideration.
5.5 Other issues
5.5.1 Cleaning and disinfection of aircraft
The Expert Group considered the use of 'Waterglass' solution to disinfect aircraft after transporting a consignment of horses. Industry stakeholders advised that 'Waterglass' was the only solution approved by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) for disinfecting aircraft. Although 'Waterglass' is a disinfectant approved for use on aircraft, the Expert group has no knowledge of its effectiveness against equine influenza virus. The Expert Group believed that the use on aircraft of other disinfectants suitable for inactivating equine influenza virus (and indeed other pathogens of quarantine concern in other imported animals) needs to be further explored by AQIS in consultation with airline operators and IATA.
5.5.2 Chemical disinfection of airstalls, trucks and other items
'Virkon®' is currently used widely by AQIS during the horse importation process to decontaminate a range of contaminated or potentially contaminated items including corral facilities, trucks, airstalls, horse equipment and footwear. The Expert Group considered alternatives to 'Virkon®' that are cheaper, less corrosive and pose less risk to people should be further investigated. The Expert Group considered the corrosive nature of 'Virkon®' on vehicles and the hazard it poses to people actually posed a potential disincentive for its correct use. Disinfectants with strong detergent properties for example, quaternary ammonium compounds (e.g. 'Zephiran®') are effective for the inactivation of equine influenza virus, and are safe and non-corrosive.
Recommendation 5
The Expert Group recommends the use of a quaternary ammonium compound for the cleaning and decontaminating of airstalls, trucks and materials potentially contaminated with equine influenza. Such compounds are not corrosive for vehicles and equipment and are safe for people to use as a disinfectant.
5.5.3 AQIS escort from the airport to the quarantine station
Following the outbreak of equine influenza AQIS introduced a procedure that requires an AQIS officer to escort the horse transport from the airport to the post-arrival quarantine station. The Expert Group was advised that this procedure was introduced as a safeguard against unforseen situations such as the risk of a truck breaking down. The Expert Group considered this procedure unnecessarily increases the time that horses remain at the airport and hence increases the biosecurity risk. Where multiple trucks are required to transport horses to the post-arrival quarantine station the requirement for an AQIS escort also increases the number of people and equipment inside the corral which also results in a greater biosecurity risk.
The Expert Group considered the escort to be unnecessary as AQIS officers currently seal all the doors of the trucks before departure from the airport. AQIS officers and truck drivers also exchange mobile telephone numbers and the land transport travels to the quarantine station along a pre-determined route. The Expert Group considered that biosecurity and animal welfare concerns are addressed adequately without the need for an AQIS officer to escort the horse transport from the airport to the post-arrival quarantine station. Further, the Expert Group believed procedures could be developed to manage unforeseen circumstances.
The Expert Group determined that the benefits of removing the AQIS escort from the airport to the quarantine station include:
a. facilitation of a more timely departure of trucks from the airport to the quarantine station i.e. once a truck is loaded it can depart the corral rather than having to wait until all trucks are loaded as is presently the case
b. a staggered arrival at the quarantine station will facilitate a more orderly unloading of the horses and signing in of personnel
c. a reduction of AQIS resourcing needs and therefore a reduction in costs for importers.
The Expert Group referred these findings to the Biosecurity Australia Working Group reviewing AQIS post-arrival quarantine procedures and operations for consideration.
6. Quarantine station facilities
In Australia, non New Zealand horse imports currently undertake post-arrival quarantine at one of three quarantine stations—Spotswood, Eastern Creek or Sandown. These facilities represent a significant investment and are important in preventing the introduction of quarantineable diseases associated with horse imports.
Criteria for post-arrival quarantine station facilities
The Expert Group assessed facilities at post-arrival quarantine stations against the following criteria:
- Facilities must be able to contain horses and potentially contaminated material (including effluent) to a manageable area and enable such material to be effectively cleaned and/or decontaminated.
- Facilities must minimise and control contact and access of people to horses and horse equipment. People and their personal effects pose a significant potential risk for pest and disease transfer. It is necessary for any contact with potentially contaminated horses or equipment be kept to a minimum and only personnel who perform essential duties should be permitted to access horses in post-arrival quarantine.
- Facilities must ensure the health and welfare of horses and personnel are maintained during post-arrival quarantine. A safe work environment for humans and horses is essential. Apart from occupational health and safety and animal welfare issues, there are also increased biosecurity risks associated with handling or managing injured horses or humans.
- Facilities should be adequate to enable quarantine procedures to be undertaken. Facilities at the quarantine station should enable routine quarantine activities such as testing and sampling to be performed in a safe environment while managing potential biosecurity risks.
6.1 Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations
Spotswood Quarantine Station
Spotswood Quarantine Station opened in 1958. The station is bounded by a two metre fence and vehicular access is through an electronic security gate. A pedestrian gate, which is locked at all times when not being used, is located next to the gatehouse. Since the outbreak of equine influenza, a security guard oversees the gatehouse 24 hours a day 7 days a week whilst horses are undertaking post-arrival quarantine. All visitors to the station are required to sign the visitor’s book at the entry. Within the station there are separate compounds for horses, cattle and other livestock, and cats and dogs, each enclosed by a 1.8 metre high fence, as well as a purpose-built microbiologically-secure bird post-arrival quarantine facility.
The lease on Spotswood Quarantine Station was renewed in November 2008 for a period of two years until November 2010. The Expert Group was advised by AQIS that the Government is currently considering options on the future of government quarantine stations including Spotswood and Eastern Creek.
Vehicular access to the horse compound is through a series of two locked gates. The space between the two gates serves as a wash area for vehicles exiting the horse compound as well as a receivables area for horse feed and supplies. Pedestrian access to the horse compound requires a quarantine officer to be present and anyone entering must be on a list of authorised personnel maintained by AQIS at the station. Pedestrian exit from the horse compound is through either of two one-way flow-through shower facilities that have been established on the perimeter of the compound adjacent to the vehicular access point.
The horse compound contains enclosed stalls in two rows separated by a passageway. Each stall opens to a small outdoor sand yard. In the main stable building there is a lavatory, a shower, feed storage area and scales. In addition to the main stable there is an open cattle shed with 24 yards within which portable pens are set up so that horses can be held overnight or if the main stables are full. During the day horses in both the temporary pens and main stable have access to a series of fenced paddocks at the southern end of the station.
The horse compound also contains a surgery with rudimentary facilities and a locked storage room for veterinary supplies. This locked room also serves as an area for storing horse equipment and personal effects that have been ordered into quarantine for the duration of the post-arrival quarantine period. Within the same building as the surgery is a tea room with basic kitchen facilities, dining table and lounge.
Cleaning of the horse compound and care of the horses are the responsibility of the importer or agent and grooms employed by them. At present there is no permanent accommodation for grooms at Spotswood Quarantine Station, and most of the regular grooms live off-site. Grooms are accommodated on-site only two or three times a year; on these occasions the importers or agents hire a caravan, placing it adjacent to the shower block in the main stable complex.
During post-arrival quarantine the first four days of horse waste (bedding and manure) is held in a concrete storage bay in the horse compound before being disposed of at a quarantine approved deep burial site as a risk management measure for exotic weed seeds. Horse waste for the remainder of the post-arrival quarantine period is held in the storage bay until the successful completion of post-arrival quarantine after which it is no longer a quarantine concern, and is disposed of as normal commercial waste.
Eastern Creek Quarantine Station
The site at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station was owned by the Commonwealth Government and had previously been part of the Wallgrove Army Camp. It opened as a quarantine station in 1980. The Commonwealth Government retained the freehold until the land was sold in April 2001, after which it took a lease beginning on 1 June 2001. The current lease at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station expires in December 2010: however, AQIS has an option to renew the lease for a further five years to 2015.
Entrance to the station is by the main security gate. Until 1992, this was a manually operated boom gate; since then access has been through an automatic retractable security gate operated by a pass. In 2002, the access pass was replaced with a swipe card. The perimeter fence of the station is approximately 1.8 metres high and encloses internal compounds delineated by similar fencing to separate the dogs and cats, the horses and the plant quarantine facility. There is also a separate bee house. As well as the animal and plant quarantine facilities, the station houses the AQIS detector dog unit.
The horse compound contains 90 stables in six rows (labelled A to F), each of 15 stalls. There are also turnout yards, a dressage arena and a horse surgery. Entrance to the horse compound is via a padlocked gate. When horses are present at the quarantine station a security guard oversees the access gate 24 hours a day 7 days week.
Horse bedding and manure waste at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station is managed in a similar way to waste at Spotswood Quarantine Station. The first four days of horse waste is placed in quarantine waste bins and disposed of as quarantine waste. Horse waste for the remainder of the quarantine period is held in concrete bunkers until the release of the horses. This waste is then loaded into 25 cubic meter bins and sent for composting.
6.1.1 Quarantine Station findings and recommendations
Overall, the Expert Group considered that the current facilities at Spotswood Quarantine Station are generally acceptable for managing biosecurity risks associated with the importation of horses. The Expert Group however has a number of concerns with the current facilities at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station, in particular, the showering arrangements, vehicular access and management of effluent and stormwater. The Expert Group concerns in relation to the shower arrangements and vehicular access were brought to the attention of AQIS in December 2008 and the Expert Group has been advised that AQIS has undertaken actions to remedy the situation as soon as possible.
The Expert Group's specific findings and recommendations with respect to the two Australian Government quarantine stations follows.
6.1.1.1 Controlling and monitoring access to the horse compound
The Expert Group was satisfied that the facilities and procedures at Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations for controlling and monitoring access to the horse compound were generally adequate, although they could be enhanced. The Expert Group noted that when grooms live on-site at either quarantine station, an AQIS officer needs to log their arrival and/or departure and escort them to and from the horse compound to the front gates. The Expert Group understood that this can occur at any time of the day or night and considered such an arrangement impractical, especially after hours when AQIS officers are not readily available.
The Expert Group considered that arrangements to control and monitor access to the horse compound at Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations could be improved through the use of electronic card access or similar technology. Such a system is currently being used successfully at Sandown Quarantine Station as a means to control and monitor access into and within the quarantine station. Access cards should be issued only to authorised personnel. Non-AQIS personnel should be required to hand the access card to an AQIS office or security guard at the front gate when they leave the quarantine station premises. An AQIS officer or security guard would need to be available to re-issue the access cards to non-AQIS personnel when they re-enter the quarantine station. For this reason and to address security issues, the Expert Group considers it necessary for either an AQIS officer or security guard to present 24 hours a day 7 days a week whilst horses are undertaking post-arrival quarantine.
To complement electronic card access, the Expert Group considered that limited, strategic use of closed circuit television (CCTV), which can be recorded for retrospective viewing, be installed at key locations to assist with monitoring personnel movements. In particular, CCTV cameras trained on the personnel entry and exit points of the perimeter shower block(s) would significantly enhance electronic card access controls, and provide a major deterrent to unacceptable practices such as skipping showers and tailgating. The Expert Group agreed that irrespective of the arrangements in place to control and monitor access to the horse compound, it is essential to keep the number of people entering the horse compound to an absolute minimum.
Recommendation 6
The Expert Group recommends the installation of an electronic card access control and monitoring system as well as limited targeted CCTV at Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations.
Recommendation 7
The Expert Group recommends that AQIS continue to ensure there is a person present to regulate entry and exit to the horse compound 24 hours a day 7 days week at Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations while horses are in post-arrival quarantine
6.1.1.2 Showering facilities
The Expert Group consider the one-way flow-through shower facilities at Spotswood Quarantine Station, which consists of two showering blocks, to be adequate. The Expert Group noted that there is sufficient hot water during peak times and there is also a kitchen and lounge area near the showering facilities where people are able to wait.
The Expert Group considered the current showering facilities at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station to be completely inadequate and brought this issue to the attention of AQIS in December 2008 (letter and reply at Appendices I and J). The Expert Group believed that the existing permanent shower block and tea room on the boundary of the horse enclosure should be renovated and one-way flow-though showering facilities installed. The Expert Group was advised that the building is currently used as staff amenities by AQIS cat and dog officers. This building could serve as the main access control point for personnel entering and leaving the horse compound at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station.
Recommendation 8
The Expert Group recommends that the existing shower block on the perimeter of the horse compound at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station be upgraded with one-way flow through showers. The existing kitchen facilities in the building should be retained. This building should also be used as the main access control point for personnel entering the horse compound.
6.1.1.3 Effluent and waste water treatment
The management of potentially contaminated liquid effluent is a critical component for the biosecurity of quarantine facilities. The Expert Group noted that at Spotswood Quarantine Station, storm water, washdown water from trucks, washdown water from animal facilities and shower water were all collected in a common system. Effluent treatment appeared to consist of an aeration process to oxidise most of the organic material followed by chemical decontamination with sodium hypochlorite.
The Expert Group observed that the aerator did not appear to be working. Such a failure has potentially serious implications for decontamination with sodium hypochlorite because high levels of organic material will inhibit chemical inactivation. In addition, there did not appear to be satisfactory understanding or management of the effluent treatment system while the AQIS officer responsible for this was absent, nor was an operation manual for the system readily available. Information on the effluent and waste water treatment should be widely understood and regularly checked by a number of staff.
At Eastern Creek Quarantine Station, the Expert Group noted that the washdown water from trucks drains to a holding tank before being used to irrigate the cattle yards within the quarantine station. It is considered a paradox that washdown water from the horse stables (that poses a high quarantine risk) together with stormwater, drains into a common watercourse that flows on to a neighbouring property towards a creek. The Expert Group considered this arrangement to be inadequate and separation of the potentially contaminated washdown water from stables should be contained and its decontamination managed on site.
Recommendation 9
The Expert Group recommends that it is a basic requirement that all contaminated or potentially contaminated effluent and wastewater must be contained on quarantine stations and managed in such a way as to address biosecurity risks and meet statutory/regulatory obligations, before going off-site. Further, effluent and wastewater management systems must be regularly monitored and maintained.
At Spotswood Quarantine Station, potentially contaminated liquid effluents are contained on site but the treatment system needed urgent overhaul and effective decontamination practices implemented.
At Eastern Creek Quarantine Station, potentially contaminated washdown water from stables must be contained and effectively decontaminated before leaving the site.
6.1.1.4 Horse stabling facilities
The Expert Group found the permanent stabling facilities at Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations to be generally adequate to meet biosecurity requirements. There are however, a number of concerns relating to animal welfare and occupational health and safety that would need to be addressed should Spotswood and Eastern Creek continue as quarantine facilities in the medium to longer term.
The concerns of the Expert Group with the permanent stabling facilities at both quarantine stations related mainly to animal welfare issues. The revised work procedures that AQIS has implemented since the Equine Influenza Inquiry require increased numbers of nasopharyngeal swabs and temperatures to be taken during the quarantine period. The Expert Group considered that there was a potential risk of horses rearing and injuring themselves or people on the low stable roofs, air vents or archways. A further concern of the Expert Group was that the stables at both quarantine stations are not well ventilated and that in warm weather they become unreasonably hot.
Recommendation 10
The Expert Group recommends that should Spotswood or Eastern Creek quarantine stations continue to be used in the medium to longer term, the horse stabling facilities must be reviewed and redesigned to reduce the risk of injury to horses and personnel, and improve ventilation.
6.1.1.5 Veterinary medical and surgical facilities
The Expert Group noted that provision of veterinary medical and surgical facilities was highly desired by industry. Both Spotswood and Eastern Creek Quarantine Stations have some form of veterinary medical and surgery facilities. However, the current surgery facilities at Spotswood Quarantine Station are outdated and rudimentary and the Expert Group were advised that specialist equine surgeons had recently indicated that the available facilities were not acceptable. The surgery facilities at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station are adequate to perform basic surgery.
Regardless, the Expert Group considers surgical facilities, no matter how desirable, are not an essential part of the infrastructure of a quarantine station from either a biosecurity or animal welfare perspective. The risk of disease or injury is a risk to an individual animal, not to the Australian general horse population; therefore the cost of reducing this risk must be borne by the owners and importers. Horse owners and importers assume an increased risk of injury or disease by transporting horses from their country of origin. It is the opinion of the Expert Group that horse owners and importers must be made aware of this increased risk and formally acknowledge that they are aware of the risk when they undertake to import the horse.
The Expert Group considers that the provision of veterinary medical and surgical facilities is a commercial issue and a matter for the horse industry and importers to address in consultation with AQIS. The Expert Group does not consider there to be suitable equine surgical facilities outside of the two quarantine stations that would be able to treat a horse while adequately managing biosecurity risks. Thus, the Expert Group is of the view that irrespective of a horse’s condition it is an unacceptable biosecurity risk to remove a horse from the quarantine station for treatment under any circumstances.
Recommendation 11
The Expert Group recommends that the horse industry and horse importers work with AQIS to determine the veterinary medical and surgical facilities and equipment that industry will provide for the treatment of imported horses that may become sick or injured at a quarantine station.
6.1.1.6 Horse crush
The Expert Group noted that the new AQIS work procedures require horse temperatures and nasopharyngeal swabs to be taken regularly throughout the post-arrival quarantine period. The Expert Group considered that a horse crush is necessary to restrain some horses thus minimising the risk of injury to people and horses associated with the increased testing and sampling. The Expert Group noted that due to differences in user preferences on the design and usability of a horse crush AQIS should consult with importers and their veterinarians on this issue.
Recommendation 12
The Expert Group recommends that AQIS provide a horse crush at both Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations to minimise the risk of injury to people and horses associated with the testing and sampling requirements. AQIS should consult with importers and their veterinarians on the type of horse crush to be provided.
6.1.1.7 Groom accommodation
There is no dedicated accommodation for grooms at Spotswood Quarantine Station. The Expert Group noted that at certain times importers provide a caravan for grooms to allow them to stay on-site as some importers prefer a groom to be on duty at all times to attend to horses throughout the post-arrival quarantine period.
The Expert Group noted the groom accommodation at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station consists of two buildings – one containing the sleeping quarters and bathroom facilities and the other a communal kitchen, dining and lounge area—connected by a covered archway. The Expert Group was advised that the groom accommodation can house up to eleven grooms within the horse compound. During an average intake (e.g. two importers with approximately 50 horses in post-arrival quarantine) there is typically 4-5 grooms staying on-site in the designated accommodation.
The Expert Group acknowledged that it is beneficial for a groom or grooms to be present in the horse compound to attend to horses. However, the Expert Group did not believe it is necessary for dedicated sleeping accommodation to be provided within the horse compound, even in the case of Eastern Creek Quarantine Station where such facilities already exist. In fact, the Expert Group considered that it is undesirable for grooms to be staying in the horse compound when they are not on-duty attending to horses. The Expert Group emphasised that this is consistent with better managing biosecurity risks by keeping the number of personnel associated with the horses in post-arrival quarantine and their entry and exit movements to an absolute minimum. The Expert Group agreed that accommodation for grooms may be provided elsewhere on the quarantine station.
Recommendation 13
The Expert Group recommends that sleeping accommodation for grooms should not be provided within the horse compound at quarantine stations, however suitable amenities should be provided for grooms that are on duty.
6.1.1.8 Exercise and sand yards
The Expert Group observed the exercise and sand yards at Spotswood Quarantine Station and noted they were not in good condition; the poor standard of fencing in particular was an issue from an animal welfare perspective. The Expert Group considered it important to be able to turn horses out in small numbers without risking injury.
The Expert Group noted that at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station in addition to the exercise and sand yards adjacent to the stabling facilities, representatives of the horse industry, in consultation with AQIS, had erected numerous exercise yards and a dressage arena. The Expert Group considered the exercise yards installed by industry are of a high standard although as a matter of basic biosecurity principles exercising of horses in the post-arrival quarantine facility introduces personnel who are not essential.
Recommendation 14
The Expert Group recommends that if Spotswood Quarantine Station is to continue as a post-arrival quarantine facility for horses beyond the current lease arrangements then the sand yards should be re-fenced to minimise the potential risk of injury to horses.
6.1.1.9 Service delivery access
The Expert Group noted that current service delivery access at Spotswood Quarantine Station (such as for horse feed, hay, stores and waste removal etc.) was not ideal as all vehicles have to transit through the horse compound. Consistent with the principles of minimising access to the horse compound during post-arrival quarantine, the Expert Group considers that options should be explored to establish a loading dock at the perimeter of the horse compound at Spotswood Quarantine Station to facilitate all service deliveries.
At Eastern Creek Quarantine Station the Expert Group noted that the configuration of the horse compound allowed service deliveries for horses to be done at the perimeter. This is consistent with sound biosecurity principles. The Expert Group was concerned however that service deliveries to the cat and dog compound transit through the horse compound. The Expert Group was advised that there were multiple AQIS vehicle movements every day that have to be managed via disinfection spray and record keeping. The Expert Group considered this arrangement posed an unnecessary biosecurity risk and was not an efficient use of resources. The Expert Group considered that a new service road to the cat and dog compound should be established so that it is not necessary to transit through the horse compound.
Recommendation 15
The Expert Group recommends that AQIS explore options to establish a loading dock at the perimeter of the horse compound at Spotswood Quarantine Station to eliminate the need for service deliveries to enter the compound.
Recommendation 16
The Expert Group recommends that AQIS establish a new access route to the cat and dog compound at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station that does not run through the horse compound.
6.1.1.10 Other issues
Work procedures—induction
The Expert Group noted that grooms are to undertake an induction each time they visit the quarantine station. Since a number of the grooms regularly accompany horses into post-arrival quarantine, the Expert Group considered it beneficial for such grooms to undertake some form of induction and accreditation that would be valid for a certain period, for example 6-12 months. The induction and accreditation arrangements could also apply to other personnel that visit the quarantine station regularly including vets, farriers and truck drivers. The Expert Group believed such an arrangement would reduce the need to induct grooms and other personnel each time there is a horse intake.
Procedural manuals at quarantine stations
The Expert Group considered operational manuals to be a critical component of overall biosecurity of quarantine stations and should be available at all times and updated regularly. The operational manuals should clearly document all relevant work procedures applying to the management of the quarantine station including emergency procedures. The Expert Group also believed the training and development and staff succession planning to be essential for the sound administration and management of all quarantine stations.
6.2 Sandown Quarantine Station
Sandown Quarantine Station is located at Sandown Racecourse in Dandenong, Victoria. It is the subject of a deed of agreement between AQIS and its operators, Racing Victoria Limited. As part of the deed Racing Victoria Limited has prepared a Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) plan that identifies quarantine risks associated with the operation of the station and the control measures to be applied to prevent or deal with identified hazards. The HACCP plan also sets out standard operating procedures for the various people who have access to the site.
Sandown Quarantine Station consists of two compounds separated by more than 300 metres. The first compound, Woodlands, first became operational in 1997. It contains one stable with eight stalls and two stables each with three stalls. Each stable is separated by 25 metres, which is the minimum requirement of some countries for separation of horses with non-equivalent health status, thus facilitating repatriation of horses after competition. The compound also contains an isolation stable for sick horses. There is on-site accommodation in the Woodlands compound for two grooms.
The second compound, Tabaret, was built in 2000. It has no on-site accommodation for grooms. This compound includes a security building where a security guard takes visitors through an entrance procedure, which involves signing the entrance register and swiping an access card on the electronic lock to gain access to the inner part of the security hut in which there is a lavatory, bathroom, shower and laundry. Depending on the category of entrant (according to the HACCP plan), a visitor must either change clothes or put on overalls when entering the area and then may go through a door giving access to the broader compound. The procedure for leaving the quarantine area requires passage through the same security building and the changing of clothes or showering, depending upon the visitor’s category according to the HACCP plan.
The Woodlands and Tabaret compounds are run as independent quarantine stations and each has a 24-hour security presence. Horses undergoing quarantine at Sandown can leave the secure quarantine area and use the racetrack under the direct supervision of a quarantine officer. This allows the horses to remain in training while in quarantine.
6.2.1 Sandown Quarantine Station findings
The Expert Group considered the post-arrival quarantine facilities at Sandown Quarantine Station to be of a high standard. The Expert Group noted the use of swipe card technology and CCTV to control and monitor access to the horse compound. The Expert Group also noted the one-way flow-through showers that allowed personnel to egress the horse compound after decontamination. In addition, the Expert Group noted the high quality stabling facilities which had good ventilation and the location of the waste and loading docks on the perimeter of the horse compound so that vehicles did not need to enter.
The Expert Group noted that the visitor shower arrangements in the security hut had no physical barrier after decontamination to prevent people from moving from a clean area to a potentially contaminated area. The Expert Group considered that this issue could be adequately managed by the security guard on-duty who could ensure decontaminated visitors exit the horse compound immediately after showering and changing into clean clothes.
During the decontamination of the road transport at Sandown Quarantine Station, the Expert Group also observed the reluctance of truck drivers to use ‘Virkon®’ due to the corrosive nature of the disinfectant. The Expert Group considered this situation could be corrected, as mentioned previously, by using a quaternary ammonium compound, such as Zephiran®, for the cleaning and decontaminating of trucks rather then ‘Virkon®’.
7. Horse separation at quarantine stations
The Expert Group considered the need for an isolation area for sick horses, and concluded that while it was desirable from first principles to be able to separate sick horses under treatment from healthy ones, a purpose built separate isolation block for sick horses was not essential for biosecurity purposes. No horse may be released from quarantine until all horses are healthy and free from contagious diseases of quarantine concern. Having a separate isolation block may be considered as desirable or even necessary by importers for commercial reasons, in which case they should discuss the matter with AQIS.
The Expert Group also considered the suggestion by Commissioner Callinan that horses in a single intake that have been imported from different regions or have undergone pre-export quarantine in different places be held in separate areas within quarantine stations.
In considering this matter, and in recognition of the fundamental and essential principle that each quarantine station operates on an all-in-all-out basis, the Expert Group considered that there was no biosecurity advantage in separating sub-groups of horses based on continent or region of origin. Indeed in some cases such horses have shared the same incoming aircraft and are thus essentially of an equivalent health status by the time of arrival. In considering this matter, the Expert Group also was of the view that separation of horses within a quarantine station based on origin may set up a false expectation that horses may co-exist at the station and be considered of a different status, and thus be able to be released at different times. It is essential that all horses in a quarantine intake are all released at the same time.
The Expert Group accordingly concluded that holding horses from different regions of origin in separate areas within a quarantine station could not be recommended as a biosecurity measure.
8. Conclusion
Australia's post-arrival quarantine facilities for the importation of horses are critical for managing biosecurity risks and maintaining Australia's favourable pest and disease status. Since the outbreak of equine influenza in August 2007 AQIS, horse importers and a range of stakeholders have strengthened post-arrival quarantine measures at airports and quarantine stations to address the issues identified by Commissioner Callinan during the Equine Influenza Inquiry.
Although much work has been done to strengthen post-arrival quarantine measures to reduce the likelihood of another disease outbreak, and the facilities reviewed by the Expert Group were generally adequate for managing biosecurity risks, there is scope for further improvements. In particular, there are a number of improvements that should be made at Spotswood and Eastern Creek quarantine stations to better manage the biosecurity risks associated with horse imports. A number of recommended improvements at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station, including the showering facilities and vehicular access, should be progressed as a priority.
The Expert Group is mindful however that the Australian Government is currently considering the future of Australia's quarantine stations with the leases on Spotswood and Eastern Creek due to expire in November 2010 and December 2010, respectively. Similarly, the Expert Group understands that Racing Victoria Limited is also considering the future of Sandown Quarantine Station.
Recommendation 17
The Expert Group recommends that irrespective of the decisions on the future of quarantine stations for horse imports, and any decisions that may be made with respect to post-arrival quarantine facilities at airports, the design and construction of any future post-arrival quarantine facilities for importing horses must be consistent with the principles and associated minimum requirements for biosecurity, animal welfare, and occupational health and safety outlined in this report.
9. Appendix A—Expert Group on Horse Importation Terms of Reference
On 12 June 2008, the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, the Hon Tony Burke MP, released the report of the Equine Influenza Inquiry and the Government’s response. The Government has agreed to all 38 of Commissioner Callinan’s recommendations.
The report of the Equine Influenza Inquiry details a number of deficiencies with the biosecurity measures in existence at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station at the time of the equine influenza outbreak. In particular, Commissioner Callinan noted that the layout and structures at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station, and to a lesser extent Spotswood Quarantine Station, are not conducive to effective implementation of biosecurity measures.
In relation to airports where horse are imported, Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport and Tullamarine, Commissioner Callinan indicates that these airports should have an enclosure and facilities for loading and transferring horses that allow biosecurity procedures to be carried out effectively and that minimise the danger or risk to the horses and those handling them. At Tullamarine there is no such permanent enclosure.
In light of these findings, the role of the AQIS Expert Group on Horse Importation (Expert Group) is to provide advice to the Executive Director of the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service on biosecurity containment and animal health and safety, as it relates to horse imports, at Eastern Creek, Spotswood and Sandown Quarantine Stations, and Sydney (Kingsford Smith) and Tullamarine Airports.
Specifically, the Expert Group is to undertake the following activities and recommend measures or upgrades to ensure appropriate biosecurity precautions are in place and the risk of injury to horses and those handling them are minimised:
- inspections and assessments of the adequacy of facilities for the unloading of and transferring of horses at Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport
- provision of advice on the adequacy of interim facilities and potential longer term facilities at Tullamarine Airport for the unloading and transferring of horses, and
- a review of facilities at Eastern Creek, Spotswood and Sandown Quarantine Stations. This review is to consider, among other matters considered relevant, the following specific factors:
a. a point of entry and exit at which people who are authorised to enter can be monitored, can shower in and out and can comply with other biosecurity requirements
b. suitable means of electronic surveillance, including closed circuit television or other measures such as smart card technology
c. a secure place to store chemicals, drugs, instruments and equipment for use by people attending the quarantined horses
d. horse stalls and yards that are separated from the main stalls and yards in the horse enclosure, to enable isolation of horses suspected or found to be suffering from contagious or infectious diseases
e. the desirability of having separate areas in the quarantine station to hold horses forming part of a single quarantine intake but that have been imported from different regions or have undergone pre-export quarantine in different places.
In undertaking this role the Expert Group will co-opt additional expertise on specific issues as necessary, liaise with the Interim Inspector-General of Horse Importation and consult with the AQIS Horse Industry Consultative Committee and other relevant stakeholders.
AQIS will provide the secretariat to the Expert Group.
The Expert Group will provide a final report, including recommendations, to the Executive Director of the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service by February 2009.
10. Appendix B—Expert Group panel members
Dr Andy Carroll (Chair)
Dr Andy Carroll is Australia’s Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO). His early veterinary background was predominantly rural having worked as a District Veterinary Officer in Queensland. He joined the Commonwealth in 1985 and has worked in several areas of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and its predecessors including animal health, and quarantine and export operations. As CVO, he is responsible for achieving high quality health outcomes for our animal industries and fauna to contribute to the return from our export industries, tourism, sport and public amenity. He has built constructive relationships within the Department and across Commonwealth agencies, as well as with State/Territory counterparts, the veterinary profession, and animal industry and environmental stakeholders.
Dr Gordon Abraham
Dr Gordon Abraham is a senior specialist, responsible for microbiological and disease security at CSIRO's Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) in Geelong, Victoria. AAHL includes a high containment facility to allow its major role of diagnosing potential outbreaks of exotic (foreign) animal disease. It is the only laboratory in Australia licensed by the Government for experimental work with exotic animal disease agents. Dr Abraham is responsible for ensuring: exotic disease and other high risk agents are handled safely; the building and laboratories are maintained and function according to specification; staff are trained appropriately to operate without breaching microbiological security; and AAHL is quarantine compliant.
Dr James Gilkerson
Dr James Gilkerson is an Associate Professor at the School of Veterinary Science, the University of Melbourne. He commenced at the School of Veterinary Science in July 2002 after five years of post-doctoral work at Macquarie University, New South Wales. His current responsibilities include teaching virology to the undergraduate veterinary students and managing several research projects into infectious diseases. He has particular expertise and interest in equine infectious diseases, particularly equine herpesvirus 1 and Rhodococcus equi epidemiology and equine disease surveillance.
Dr Hugh Millar
Dr Hugh Millar is the Deputy Director Biosecurity Victoria / Chief Veterinary Officer, Victorian Department of Primary Industries. He has over 25 years experience in veterinary science and the management of animal health and quarantine programs. He is a member of the national Animal Health Committee and the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Disease. He is responsible for animal health policy development in Victoria, and has managed quarantine and animal health programs, legislation, and regulatory activity. He has international experience, having travelled extensively overseas on behalf of the Australian Government to supervise the preparation of consignments of livestock destined for import into Australia, and to liaise with international veterinary authorities on matters of importance to Australia’s trade in livestock and livestock products.
Dr Mike Nunn (ex-officio)
Dr Mike Nunn is the Principal Scientist (Animal Biosecurity) at Biosecurity Australia. He is a veterinary epidemiologist with extensive overseas and Australian experience in the prevention and control of animal diseases. He has provided advice to a range of regional and international organisations, including the South Pacific Commission, the Asian Development Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Organisation for Animal Health on topics ranging from animal health surveillance systems to emerging zoonoses. He has particular interests in the pathobiology of disease, risk analysis, epidemiology and veterinary public health, including the ecology of emerging infectious diseases and the management of emergency animal diseases.
11. Appendix C—Stakeholder consultation
Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service
International Racehorse Transport
Crispin Bennett International Horse Transport
New Zealand Bloodstock
Australian Horse Council
Australian Racing Board
Harness Racing Australia
Equestrian Federation of Australia
Thoroughbred Breeders Australia
Racing Victoria Limited
Australian Veterinary Association
Melbourne Airport
Sydney Airport Corporation Limited
Board of Airline Representative of Australia (BARA)
Singapore Airlines
Cathay Pacific
Qantas
FedEx
Atlas Air
Cargo Lux
SITA Environmental Services
TOLL Dnata
RAMM Australia
Menzies Aviation
Instone Air Services
Aerocare
Note: Appendices D, E, F, G and H have been removed from this version of the Expert Group report due to copyright issues.
12. Appendix D—Melbourne Airport post-arrival quarantine facilities
13. Appendix E—Sydney Airport post-arrival quarantine facilities
14. Appendix—Spotswood Quarantine Station
15. Appendix—Eastern Creek Quarantine Station
16. Appendix—Sandown Quarantine Station, Woodlands Compound
17. Appendix I—Expert Group letter to Rob Delane, Executive Director of AQIS—Showering arrangements and vehicular access at Eastern Creek Quarantine Station
Expert Group letter to Rob Delane, Executive Director of AQIS
18. Appendix J—Rob Delane, Executive Director of AQIS, response to the Expert Group—Showering arrangements and vehicular access at Easter Creek Quarantine Station
Rob Delane, Executive Director of AQIS, response to the Expert Group
Footnotes
- Callinan, I. (2008) Equine Influenza: the August 2007 outbreak in Australia (Report of the Equine Influenza Inquiry). Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. Available online (at: http://www.equineinfluenzainquiry.gov.au/eiiexhibits/REP.0001.001.0001.pdf).
- Equine Influenza Inquiry Government Response. Available online (at: http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/word_doc/0007/690703/ei-response.doc).